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Abstract
Encryption is a vital process to ensure the confidentiality of the information transmitted over
an insecure wireless channel. However, the nature of the wireless channel tends to deteriorate
because of noise, interference and fading. Therefore, a symmetrically encrypted transmitted
signal will be received with some amount of error. Consequently, due to the strict avalanche
criterion (SAC), this error propagates during the decryption process, resulting in half the
bits (on average) after decryption to be in error. In order to alleviate this amount of error,
smart coding techniques and/or new encryption algorithms that take into account the nature
of wireless channels are required. The solution for this problem could involve increasing the
block and key lengths which might degrade the throughput of the channel. Moreover, these
solutions might significantly increase the complexity of the encryption algorithms and hence
to increase the cost of its implementation and use.
Two main approaches have been followed to solve this problem, the first approach is
based on developing an effective coding schemes and mechanisms, in order to minimize
and correct the errors introduced by the channel. The second approach is more focused on
inventing and implementing new encryption algorithms that encounter less error propagation,
by alleviating the SAC effect. Most of the research done using these two approaches lacked
the comprehensiveness in their designs. Some of these works focused on improving the error
performance and/or enhancing the security on the cost of complexity and throughput.
In this work, we focus on solving the problem of encryption in wireless channels in a comprehensive way, that considers all of the factors in its structure (error performance, security
and complexity). New encryption algorithms are proposed, which are modifications to the
Standardized Encryption Algorithms and are shown to outperform the use of the these algorithms in wireless channels in terms of security and error performance with a slight addition
in the complexity. We introduce new modifications that improves the error performance for
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a certain required security level while achieving the highest possible throughput. We show
how our proposed algorithm outperforms the use of other encryption algorithms in terms of
the error performance, throughput, complexity and is secure against all known encryption
attacks. In addition, we study the effect of each round and S-Box in symmetric encryption
algorithms on the overall probability of correct reception at the receiver after encryption
and the effect on the security is analyzed as well. Moreover, we perform a complete security, complexity and energy consumption analysis to evaluate the new developed encryption
techniques and procedures. We use both analytical computations and computer simulations
to evaluate the effectiveness of every modification we introduce in our proposed designs.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1

Motivations and Contributions

Encryption is an essential process to assure confidentiality because wireless channels are
open media to intruders in which they can intercept and alter the content of any transmitted
information. Well known standardized encryption algorithms such as the data encryption
standard (DES) were designed to achieve security against intruders. To accomplish this, DES
(as well as other symmetric encryption algorithms) was designed in such a way to satisfy
what is known as the strict avalanche criterion (SAC). The SAC of an algorithm requires
that encrypting two slightly different plaintexts (i.e., the data before encryption) with the
same key results in two different ciphertexts (i.e., the data after encryption), on average half
the bits will be different even though the plaintexts are different by a single bit only. This
criterion also requires that decrypting two slightly different ciphertexts with the same key
results in two different plaintexts, on average half the bits will be different even though the
ciphertexts are different by a single bit only. Any algorithm that satisfy this property does
not exhibit any statistical correlation between input and output that an adversary might
use in attacks. Thus the algorithm will multiply the bit errors multifolds; i.e., if there is one
error in the received ciphertext, there will be many errors in the decrypted plaintext.
The SAC is a desirable property in encryption algorithms, because any plaintexts with
slight difference will result in different ciphertexts, hence make the algorithm secure against
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Chosen-Plaintext (CP) attackers. The S-Box in DES was designed in such a way to meet
the SAC [1], [2]. However, this criterion becomes catastrophic in wireless channels because
wireless channel tends to deteriorate because of noise, interference and fading. Therefore, it
is clearly noticed that any algorithm that satisfies the avalanche criterion is very sensitive
to bit errors. If one bit of the ciphertext is received in error, each bit of the plaintext will
have a probability of error equal to 0.5.
This problem attracted a lot of research due to its great impact on wireless applications.
Two main approaches were followed to solve this problem. The first approach was based
on developing effective coding schemes and mechanisms in the physical layer, in order to
correct and minimize the errors caused by the channel [3]-[5]. The second approach is more
focused on inventing and implementing new encryption algorithms that encounter less error
propagation, and hence alleviating the SAC [6]-[8]. In [6] a new mode of operation is used
with the use of DES to transmit the encrypted data over the wireless channel. While in [7],
a new encryption algorithm is introduced, which is a modification to the Data Encryption
Standard (DES) and is shown to outperform the standard DES when implemented in wireless channels, moreover, the proposed algorithm is shown to outperform the used mode of
operation in [6]. In [8], the authors developed an optimized framework for encryption over
wireless channels using the Rijndael algorithm. The proposed mechanism in [8] is mainly
based on using longer block and key sizes whenever the channel conditions are better.

1.2

Organization of the Dissertation

In the beginning of this dissertation and after presenting the background of the dissertation
subject and some related work from the literature in chapter 2, in chapter 3 we evaluate
the security enchantment of the new round proposed in M-DES in a more comprehensive
way, where we numerically evaluate the probability of a successful attack on the proposed
algorithm as well as calculating the time required for such an attack. In addition, we also
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evaluate the effect of number of rounds and number of S-Boxes on the probability of correct
reception assuming different channel conditions (i.e. different signal-to-noise ratio (SNR)
values). Moreover, we evaluate the effect of number of rounds and number of S-Boxes on the
security level of the encrypted data in DES as well as in the new round proposed in [7]. The
remaining part of this dissertation can be classified in two parts. In the first part, we propose
two new encryption algorithms that improves the error performance and throughput in the
wireless channel. While in the second part, we evaluate the performance of the proposed
algorithms in regard to other well-known standardized encryption algorithms, in term of
their complexity and their energy consumption.
In chapter 4 we use a similar mechanism as in [8] and apply it to an adaptive variable
block size version of the modified DES introduced in [7]. In particular, we propose a variable
key and cipher sizes rather than the fixed 136-bit key and 128-bit cipher used in [7]. We
use analytical results to show that our proposed optimized algorithm outperforms the use of
Rijndael with variable length as well as the 256-bit AES algorithm, in terms of throughput
for a fixed required security level. We also study the security of the proposed algorithm by
evaluating its strength against applicable attacks. In chapter 5, we propose a new encryption
algorithm where we modify the S-Box design in addition to applying a key coded permutation box at the output of DES, where we use an 80-bit key to permutate the encrypted
sub-frames. We use hamming(7,4) codes due to their simplicity and effectiveness in error
detection and correction. In addition, four bits are required to code four bits of information, which perfectly fits our application. In another design we add another 80-bit key to
permutate the coded encrypted blocks to the proposed algorithm output, which increase the
confusion of the encrypted information and hence enhance the security of the algorithm.
Using simulation and numerical results, we show that by using KBCP-M-DES we experience more reliable data transmission compared to AES and DES. In chapter 6, we introduce
a comprehensive analytical complexity analysis for the proposed algorithms as well as for
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well-known standardized encryption algorithms. The complexity analysis of this class of
encryption algorithms (Symmetric Encryption Algorithms) had attracted many researchers,
who developed and used different methodologies to analyze and compute the complexity
[9]-[11]. However, those methodologies lacked the comprehensiveness in their analysis, due
to the ignorance of the memory access time, which greatly affects the performance. In our
analysis, we use a comprehensive methodology where we consider the memory access time required by the algorithm unlike other methodologies. We show that our proposed algorithms
outperforms AES and 3-DES in terms of the complexity while it adds a slight addition to
the complexity of DES which is considered insecure. In chapter 7, we use a combination of
two different approaches to compute the energy of the encryption and decryption process on
a certain microprocessor, and to use the bit-error-rate results computed at the receiver to
measure the energy savings from one algorithm to the other. In this chapter we first analyze the energy consumption of the selected encryption algorithms based on their hardware
complexities. In other words, we calculate the total number of required instructions (i.e,
arithmetic, logic and memory access instructions) to encrypt one or more blocks of data.
Based on the hardware used for encryption, we can calculate the energy consumed by each
instruction using that particular hardware. Hence, we can calculate the total energy consumed by the encryption algorithm on any particular hardware. Next, we analyze the energy
savings of each encryption algorithm in regards to the no encryption case, based on the SNR
savings for a certain bit error rate (BER) requirement. This is an excellent indicator of the
energy saving in a wireless channel environment as shown in [12]-[18].
As a result, in this dissertation we propose new encryption algorithms that can be used in
wireless application to improve the error performance and enhance the security. In addition,
we introduce comprehensive evaluation methods to show that our proposed algorithms outperform other secure well-known encryption algorithms in terms of their error performance,
security, throughput, complexity and energy consumption.
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Chapter 2
Background and Related Work
2.1

Chapter Overview

In this chapter we introduce the main background elements of cryptography, but we focus
on those elements that are more applicable in wireless communication. Moreover, we present
related work from the literature and point out to the trade-offs that these works encounters.

2.2

Classification of Cryptosystems

Cryptosystems are classified based on their encryption mechanism, which basically depends
on the number of keys used for encryption, the secrecy of those keys, and how they are
handled. In the following we state the two main classes of cryptosystems and their properties.
However, in the rest of this chapter as well as most of this dissertation, we will be interested
in symmetric cryptosystems.

2.2.1

Symmetric Cryptosystems

Symmetric Cryptosystems are a class of encryption algorithms that use one key for both
encryption and decryption. This class is also known as private cryptosystems, because the
key used in encryption and decryption is kept secret between the communication parties [19].
The key is exchanged and managed using known algorithms that deal with the key initiation
and exchange process, such as diffie-helman, SHA-1, etc. [19], [20]. Fig. 2.1 shows the
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general design of symmetric cryptosystems, by which Alice uses the key shared between her
and Bob to encrypt a message and send it to him. Upon receiving the encrypted message,
Bob decrypts it using the same key Alice used for encryption.

Figure 2.1. Symmetric (Private) key cryptography

2.2.2

Asymmetric Cryptosystems

The asymmetric cryptosystems are called asymmetric because they use two distinct keys for
encryption and decryption, unlike symmetric cryptosystems. The encryption is done with
the public key of the intended receiver of the message, while the decryption is performed by
the private key of the receiver [19], [20]. Assuming Alice wants to send an encrypted message
to Bob over the network, Alice needs to encrypt the message with the public key she obtained
through Bob’s broadcasting. When Bob receives the encrypted message, he can decrypt it
using his private key that he kept as a secret and didn’t share it on the network. Therefore,
each user on the network should generate two keys, one key being called the public key
which he broadcasts over the network, so that any user that wants to send him a message
will use this key to do so. The other generated key will be called the private key, which the
user keeps as a secret for himself, so that he will be able to decrypt any message that was
originally encrypted with his public key. Fig. 2.2 explains the general idea of asymmetric
encryption. This kind of encryption is also known as a public cryptosystem because each
6

user shares one of his keys with the rest of the network users.

Plaintext

Plaintext

Decryption

Encryption

Cipherte

Cipherte

Figure 2.2. Asymmetric (Public) key cryptography

2.3

Block Ciphers

Block ciphers are ciphers that are symmetric (same key for encryption and decryption) and
work on a fixed length block of bits. Those ciphers take an input of a certain bit length and
produce a ciphertext of the same, longer, or shorter length. These ciphers use a secret key
of a fixed bit length. The same key is used for encryption and decryption. Lucifier is the
first known block cipher and was designed by IBM in 1970 [19].

2.3.1

Block Cipher Design

Substitution and Permutation
Substitution is an encryption method by which units of the plaintext are replaced with
ciphertext according to a regular system or a table. The unit may be a single bit, letter,
pairs of bits or letters, or more. The inverse substitution is performed at the receiver side
to obtain the original text. There are different types of substitution methods such as the
simple substitution cipher by which the algorithm operates on a single bit or letter. Another
7

type is called the polygraphic substitution, by which the algorithm operates on a large group
of letters or bits. A substitution cipher can be also classified in terms of it being fixed or
not. For example, the monoalphabetic cipher uses fixed substitution all over the algorithm.
On the other hand, the polyalphabetic cipher uses a number of substitutions throughout the
encryption process, therefore the same input may be mapped to different outputs at different
stages or phases of the encryption process.
Permutation is an encryption method by which units of the plaintext are rearranged in
some new order. The number of ways that n distinct letters can be reordered is n!. Some
cipher permutations have the same size as the plaintexts while others are longer or shorter
in size. A Longer cipher implies that some bits in the plaintext were copied, while a shorter
cipher implies that some bits of the plaintext are dropped. Substitution and Permutation
are both important in the design of a block cipher to insure confusion and diffusion, where
confusion is the property of making the relationship between the key and the resulting cipher
as complex and involved as possible. Diffusion means that the ciphertext bits should depend
on the plaintext bits in a very complicated way. Both terms were originally defined by Claude
E. Shannon [20].

2.3.2

Block Cipher Properties

Diffusion
Diffusion is the property of making the relationship between the plaintext and the ciphertext
as complex and involved as possible. In other words, having two plaintexts that are different
by one bit only, should result in two completely different ciphertexts. Therefore, each bit of
the ciphertext depends on all the bits in the plaintext.
Confusion
Confusion is the property of making the relationship between the key and the ciphertext as
complex and involved as possible. The objective of confusion is to make it very hard to find
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the key even if a large number of plaintext-ciphertext pairs that were encrypted using the
same key are available. To achieve this goal, each bit of the ciphertext should depend on
all the bits of the key, In other words, changing one bit of the key should change the entire
ciphertext, i.e., by changing one bit of the input, each bit of the output have a probability of
0.5 to be changed. The avalanche effect is a great sensor for good and effective randomization
inside the algorithm.
Avalanche Effect
The avalanche effect is a desirable property of block cipher encryption algorithms to ensure
security. This property guarantees that changing one or more bits of plaintext changes the
output significantly. Similarly, by changing one or more bits of the key, the output changes
significantly as well. However, the strict avalanche criterion assures that changing one or
more bits of the input will change half the bits of the output on average [8].

2.3.3

Block Cipher Modes

In this section we introduce the various modes of operation used for encryption.
Electronic Codebook (ECB) Mode
In this mode each block is encrypted and transmitted separately as shown in Fig. 2.3. Using
this mode, encrypting each block separately makes this mode simple and less complex. It
also serves as a clean architecture boundary for other modes of encryption [19], [20].

Security
This mode of operation does not add any security to the encrypted data, the security is
based totally on the security of the used algorithm only. Because encrypting a plaintext
many times with the same key will result in the same ciphertext. The National Institute
of Standards and Technology approves the use of the ECB mode with a FIPS-approved encryption algorithm such as AES and 3-DES.
9

Figure 2.3. Electronic Code Block (ECB)

Complexity
This mode of operation adds no complexity to the encryption process, therefore the number
of added operations or clock cycles is zero using the ECB mode.
Error Performance
This mode of operation does not have any effect on the bit error rate. When the encrypted
data is transmitted over the channel, the only source for the error is in fact caused by the
channel conditions only. The ECB mode does not affect the error performance in any way.
This mode is considered the best in terms of bit error rate compared to other modes of
operations.
Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) Mode
In this mode the first data block is XORed with a random number called the initial vector
(IV) before encryption, the initial vector has the same length as the data block. The first
encrypted block is then XORed with the next plaintext block before being encrypted with
the same key [19], [20]. The same process is repeated for all blocks as shown in Fig. 2.4.
Security
This mode does not increase the security of the used algorithm significantly. However,
this mode can alleviate the need to change the used key occasionally, due to the fact that
encrypting a plaintext many times will result in different ciphertexts each time. Because
10

Figure 2.4. Cipher Block Chaining (CBC)

the encryption procedure depends on the previous ciphertext in addition to the key and the
random IV. However, this mode does not make the encryption algorithm immune against
Chosen-Plaintext Attacks such as the differential cryptanalysis attack, due to the fact that
the IV is of the same length as the algorithm’s block. Therefore, if the underlying algorithm
is insecure against differential cryptanalysis and linear cryptanalysis, the addition of the CBC
mode will not make it immune to this attack. On the other hand, if the underlying algorithm
is impossible to break using those attacks (i.e., AES is immune to those attacks), the addition
of the CBC mode does not degrade nor improve the performance of the algorithm against
those attacks. Complexity
On the other hand, this mode adds some complexity due to the extra XOR operation before
encryption. Assuming that the ciphertext is N bits long, then N/8 byte-wise additional XOR
operations are required. Hence 3 ×

N
8

additonal clock cycles are required to encrypt each

block. Assuming DES is used for encryption, 8 additional clock cycles are required, which
means that 24 additional clock cycles are required to encrypt each block of information.
Although this addition seems to be insignificant, it becomes noticeable when a large amount
of data is encrypted.
Error Performance
11

The problem of this mode is the error propagation. That is, if an error that is imposed by
the channel affects one ciphertext, after decryption not only the associated plaintext with
the affected ciphertext will be in error, but the next plaintext will be decrypted in error as
well. Moreover, due to the avalanche criterion half the bits of both plaintexts will be received
in error. Therefore, this mode increases the bit error rate and hence the error performance
using this mode of operation will be degraded.
Cipher Feedback (CFB) Mode
In this mode, the initial vector is first encrypted, then the encrypted vector is divided into
two parts. Assuming that the block cipher is n bits long and the plaintext is r bits long,
the first r bits of the encrypted vector are XORed with the first plaintext block. The second
block is encrypted similarly [19], [20], but the initial vector is shifted by r-bits (i.e. the
previous ciphertext is shiffted into the current plaintext), successive blocks are encrypted
similarly as shown in Fig. 2.5.
Security
n bits

IV

n bits

n bits
Shiftting by r bits

Shiftting by r bits

K
K

E

P1

......

E

XOR

r bits

C1

E

CN

The first r bits

The first r bits
r bits

K

r bits

XOR

P2

r bits

C2

Figure 2.5. Cipher Feedback (CFB)

The security addition of this mode is exactly the same as that of the CBC mode. That is,
this mode reduces the need to change the key frequently, due to the fact that encrypting
12

a plaintext with the same key will result in a different ciphertext each time encryption
is performed. Moreover, this is a result of having the previous ciphertext as an input to
encrypt the next plaintext. However, this mode does not increase the security against chosenplaintext attacks such as differential cryptanalysis and linear cryptanalysis.
Complexity
This mode of encryption includes shifting the IV by the previous ciphertext before encrypting
the IV, then the parts of the encrypted shifted IV are XORed with the current plaintext.
Assuming that the plaintext consists of r bits, therefore, r/8 byte-wise shift operations and
r/8 XOR operations are required. Hence, 80 ×

r
8

+3×

r
8

= 10 × r + 3 ×

r
8

additional clock

cycles are required to encrypt one block of information.
Error Propagation
The error propagation of this mode follows the exact same behavior of the CBC mode.
Output Feedback (OFB) Mode
This mode is exactly the same as the previous mode except that the second initial vector is
shifted by the first r bits of the previous encrypted IV. Therefore, the IV for each block is
the previous block’s IV shifted by r bits each time. Figure 2.6 shows the concept of output
feedback [19], [20].
Security
This mode of operation follows the same security characteristics of the CBC and CFB modes.
Complexity
The complexity addition of this mode is similar to that of the CFB mode.
Error Propagation
The error propagation of this mode follows the exact same behavior of the CBC and CFB
modes.
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Figure 2.6. Output Feedback (OFB)

Counter (CTR) Mode
Each cipher block is independent of the other blocks in this mode. Each data block has its
unique IV which is an increment of the previous IV. The IV is encrypted and XORed with
the data block. The IV should be of the same size of the data block. The counter mode is
shown in Fig. 2.7.
Security

Figure 2.7. Counter (CTR)

This mode adds the same security characteristics that are added by CBC, CBF and OFB
modes. That is due to the fact that each plaintext will result in a different ciphertext if it is
14

encrypted more than one time, this is because each time the counter is encrypted with the
same key before being XORed with the plaintext. However, the counter is always changing
with the time, hence, the value that is XORed with the plaintext is changed at each point
of time. Therefore, there is no need to change the key frequently. On the other hand, as the
previous modes, this mode does not add any immunity against chosen-plaintext attacks.
Complexity
This mode adds some complexity that is equal to that added by the CBC modes and less
than that added by CFB and OFB, because the only addition in this mode is the XOR
operation. Hence, n/8 byte-wise XOR operations are required, which means that 3 × n8 clock
cycles are required in this mode of operation.
Error Propagation
The main advantage of this mode is that it does not exhibit any error propagation as that
of CBC, CFB and OFB. Although, this mode achieves the same security critiria of the
CBC, CFB and the OFB modes, it does not have any effect on the error performance of
the encryption algorithm. It also adds less complexity than that added by the CFB and OFB.

Table 1.1 summarizes the difference between different modes of operation and their effect
on the security, complexity and error propagation.

Table 2.1. Properties of various modes of operation

Mode
ECB
CBC
CFB
OFB
CTR

Security
None
Key Security
Key Security
Key Security
Key Security

Complexity
Error Propagation
No Addition
No
Slight Addition
Yes
High Addition
Yes
High Addition
Yes
Slight Addition
No
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2.4

Cryptanalysis of Block Ciphers

2.4.1

Brute Force Attack

The brute force attack is the basic and most straight forward attack. The attack idea is
based on trying all possible keys to decrypt some ciphertext. Each time the attacker will
check the obtained plaintext and if it matches his expectation, then that certain key used
to obtain this plaintext is the correct key that was used in the encryption process. The
following assumptions must be made in order for this attack to work:
1. It is assumed that the attacker knows the algorithm that is used for encryption.
2. It is assumed that the attacker has access to some ciphertext.
3. It is assumed that the attacker knows the type of the data that was encrypted (example:
bank accounts information, employees information)
For example, assuming that some encryption algorithm has a key of 4 bits. Then, if an
attacker wants to use the brute force attack, it is assumed that he has obtained some ciphertext and knows which algorithm was used. The attack mechanism is based on trying all
possible key combinations starting from 0000 up to 1111, which corresponds to 24 = 16 keys.
When the plaintext makes sense to the attacker or meets his expectation, then the key that
was used to obtain that plaintext is the correct key, and hence the attacker has cracked the
algorithm. Therefore, in order for an encryption algorithm to be secure against this type of
attacks it should have the following characteristics:
• The primary factor in keeping the algorithm secure against brute force attack is to
have a long key such that the intruder can not check all of its possible combination in
a feasible time.
• The key should be changed in a certain amount of time that is less than the time it takes
an attacker to guess it. For example if the intruder can guess a 10-bit key in 2 seconds,
16

the key should be changed every 1 second. However, this solution will have a major
drawback, which is the key management. Managing a key that is changing every 1
second and managing its transfer between the two or more parties of the communication
channel can be exhausting and needs more resources and time. However using a 128-bit
key for example is considered secure and there is no need to change it for the current
used technology.
• The algorithm itself can be secure, so the attacker will not know how long is the key nor
how to do the decryption process. For example, some companies develop and use their
own encryption algorithm without revealing it to the outer world. This solution may
be reasonable, but it will limit the use of such encryption algorithms to a very narrow
scope. For example, the encryption algorithm can not be used for the companies outer
communication because nobody other than the company itself knows the algorithm,
and hence nobody can decrypt their ciphertexts.

2.4.2

Differential Cryptanalysis

History
Differential Cryptanalysis is a general technique of cryptanalysis applicable primarily to
block ciphers. It is based on studying the relationship between the ciphertexts of closely
related plaintexts, trying to discover where the attacked algorithm does not explore random
behavior. It was introduced as a successful method of attack by Eli Biham and Adi Shamir in
the late 1980s, where they published a paper including a theoretical attack that can attack
the Data Encryption Standard (DES) and obtain its key, given the fact that 247 pairs of
plaintext and ciphertext are available to the attacker and all pairs were encrypted using
the same key [21]. Although the attack might be hard to be applicable, one of it shows
that there is a possible flow in the design of DES. However, Don Coppersmith, the IBM
DES original team members stated later that his team was aware of this attack as was the
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National Security Foundation (NSA), but it was kept secret to keep the United States in
front of other countries in the science of cryptography, and it was called the T-attack or
the Tickle attack within the IBM team. DES was designed with this attack in mind while
previous ciphers where not, until Shamir and Biham showed after 13 years that it can be
attacked using this attack.
Attack idea
Differential cryptanalysis is usually a chosen plaintext attack. A chosen plaintext attack is
an attack based on the ability of the attacker to chose any plaintext and be able to obtain
its corresponding ciphertext. The attacker is assumed to be ignorant about the key, so it
is the final objective of the attacker to obtain the key using a sufficient number of chosen
plaintexts.
The basic method of the differential cryptanalysis attack is based on calculating the
difference between pairs of plaintexts δx , and the difference between their corresponding
ciphertext is analyzed to detect any statistical patterns in their distribution. The difference
is usually measured in terms of the XOR operation.
The statistical properties depend primarily on the nature of the used S-Box. Therefore,
the attacker uses pairs of differences called differentials (δx , δy ), where δx is the difference
between two inputs and δy is defined as δy = S(X ⊕δx )⊕S(X). Therefore, δy is the difference
between the result of entering X into a specific S-Box, XOR-ed with the result of entering the
difference between two inputs (one of them is X) to the same S-Box. Hence, one particular
ciphertext difference is expected to be more frequent, so the cipher can be distinguished from
the random outputs [22].
Attack Mechanism
The attack basically consists of the following steps:
• The difference between two ciphertexts is observed as a function of the difference
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between the corresponding plaintexts.
• The highest probability differential input is found.
• The keys are assigned certain probabilities and the most probable key is located.
Each S-Box in DES has a 6-bit input and 4-bit output. Assuming that we have two inputs
for one S-box (x, x∗ ), each of x and x∗ have 64 possible values, and hence the tuple (x, x∗ )
will have 642 = 4096 possible values. As the six bit variables x, x∗ and x0 = x ⊕ x∗ vary over
their 64 possible values, the four bit variables y = S(x), y ∗ = S(X ∗ ) and y 0 = y ⊕ y ∗ vary
over their possible 16 values. Therefore, we have 64 values for x0 and 16 values for y 0 . Hence,
some of the values for y 0 are going to be the same.
The distribution of y 0 can be found by counting the number of times each of the possible
values of y 0 are repeated over varying the values of x0 . This process is repeated for each of
the eight S-Boxes. Table 1.5 shows the distribution of y 0 for the first S-Box in DES. x0 is
a 6-bit values, hence it takes values from 00 to 3F, while y 0 is a 4-bit value, hence it takes
values from 0 to F. The summation of each row is 64, because each input difference x0 occurs

Table 2.2. Differentials Distribution table of DES S-Box 1

x0
00
01
02
03
..
.

0
64
0
0
14

1
0
0
0
4

2
0
0
0
2

3 4
0 0
6 0
8 0
2 10

5 6
0 0
2 4
4 4
6 4

7
0
4
4
2

8 9
0 0
0 10
0 6
6 4

A
0
12
8
4

B C D
0 0 0
4 10 6
6 12 6
0 2 2

E
0
2
4
2

F
0
4
2
0

0C
..
.

0

0

0

8

0

6

6

0

0

6

6

4

6

6

14

2

34
..
.

0

8

16

6

2

0

0

12

6

0

0

0

0

8

0

6

3E
3F

4
4

8
8

2
2

2
2

2
2

4
4

4
4

14
14

4
4

2
2

0
0

2
2

0
0

8
8

4
4

4
4

for 64 out of the 4096 total cases of (x, x∗ ). For the first row, x0 = 0, when x0 = x ⊕ x∗ = 0.
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Therefore, y 0 = 0, for all the 64 cases where x = x∗ (x0 = 0). Similarly, for the next row for
example, there are 64 cases for (x, x∗ ) where x0 = x ⊕ x∗ = 01, but the difference y 0 varies
between 0 to F for all 64 input cases.
• When x0 = 01, y 0 will never be 0,1,2, 4 or 8. Therefore the probability of having
y 0 = 0, 1, 2, 4 or 8 given that x0 = 01 is equal to zero.
• The probability of having y 0 = 5 or E, given that x0 = 01 is 2/64 = 1/32
• The probability of having y 0 = 6, 7, B or F , given that x0 = 01 is 4/64 = 1/16
• The probability of having y 0 = D, given that x0 = 01 is 6/64
• The probability of having y 0 = 9 or C, given that x0 = 01 is 10/64
• The probability of having y 0 = A, given that x0 = 01 is 12/64
The same process is repeated for all S-Boxes, so that each of the eight S-boxes will have
a different differentials distributions table. It is clear that the tables are non uniformly
distributed.
Considering the case were x0 is 34 in the mapping table of the first S-Box of DES, the
possible outputs y 0 are 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, D and F. The number of occurrences for each of the
possible outputs are 8, 16, 6, 2, 12, 6, 8 and 6, respectively.
Determining the key
Assuming that we know that the inputs for the S-Box1 are 01 and 35, the XOR of the two
inputs is 34. Both inputs will be XORed with the key before getting to the S-Box. The
XOR for the two inputs after the key XOR stage will remain the same. That tells us that
the input XOR is independent of the key. The following equation shows the proof.
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S1,S1*

+

Key (K)

S2,S2*

S1

S3,S3*
Figure 2.8. XOR operation before and after S-Box1

S20 = S2 ⊕ S2∗
= (S1 ⊕ K) ⊕ (S1∗ ⊕ K)
= S1 ⊕ S1∗ = S10
where S1 and S1∗ are the two inputs, while S10 is the XOR of the two inputs. S2 and S2∗
are the two inputs after XORing with the key, while S20 is the XOR of the two inputs after
XORing each one of them with the key. S3 and S3∗ are the two inputs after the S-Box phase,
while S3 ’ is the XOR of the two inputs after each one of them passes by the S-Box. Figure
2.8 shows those stages in detail.
Since S10 = S20 , then both should be equal to 34. We know that S1 and S1∗ where 01 and
35 respectively. However, all the possible cases for S2 and S2∗ are 06,10,16,1C,22,2428 and
32. Given equation 2.4.1, we can notice the following relationship
S2 = S1 ⊕ K
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Therefore
K = S1 ⊕ S2
Hence, we can try to guess the key given this information. Moreover, the key will be one of
the XOR results of all possible values of S1 and S2 .

06 ⊕ 01 = 07

06 ⊕ 35 = 33

10 ⊕ 01 = 11

10 ⊕ 35 = 25

16 ⊕ 01 = 17

16 ⊕ 35 = 23

1C ⊕ 01 = 1D

1C ⊕ 35 = 29

22 ⊕ 01 = 23

22 ⊕ 35 = 17

24 ⊕ 01 = 25

24 ⊕ 35 = 11

28 ⊕ 01 = 29

28 ⊕ 35 = 1D

32 ⊕ 01 = 33

32 ⊕ 35 = 07

So the possible key is one of the following 07, 11, 17, 1D, 23, 25, 29, 33. To narrow this set,
another pair (which XOR is 34) is taken and the same procedure is repeated. For example,
S1 = 21 and S1∗ = 15, moreover S10 and S20 are both equal to 34. Hence all possible values
for S2 and S2∗ are 01, 02, 15, 21, 35 and 36. By repeating the same process of XORing all
possible values of S1 with all possible values of S2 to find all possible keys
01 ⊕ 21 = 20

01 ⊕ 15 = 14

02 ⊕ 21 = 23

02 ⊕ 15 = 17

15 ⊕ 21 = 34

15 ⊕ 15 = 00

21 ⊕ 21 = 00

21 ⊕ 15 = 34

35 ⊕ 21 = 14

35 ⊕ 15 = 29

36 ⊕ 21 = 17

36 ⊕ 15 = 23
22

So the possible key is one of the following {20, 23, 34, 00, 14, 17, 29}. However, the correct
key must appear in both sets. Therefore, by intersecting {07, 11, 17, 1D, 23, 25, 29, 33}
with {20, 23, 34, 00, 14, 17, 29}, the key must be either 17 or 23. To determine which one
is the correct key, more pairs of our selection must be available.

2.4.3

Linear Cryptanalysis

History
The linear Cryptanalysis attack was created by Mitsuru Matsui in 1992. The attack was
first applied to the fast data Encipherment Algorithm (FEAL) and then to DES. The attack
is shown to break DES using 243 known plaintext [23], [24]. The attack is based on finding
affine approximations to the action of a cipher.
Attack idea
A known plaintext attack is the ability of the attacker to have a samples of plaintext and
their corresponding ciphertexts. The shortcoming of this attack is that the attacker is not
able to chose a specific plaintext to obtain its ciphertext. However, if the attacker is lucky,
the needed pairs might be included in the sample that he already has. The attack assumes
that the attacker has the ability to hack into someone’s database to get those pairs or get
them by any other way.
The linear cryptanalysis attack is based on trying to construct linear equations to relate
the ciphertext with the plaintext and the key. Any linear equation relating the plaintext,
ciphertext, and the key should hold with a probability of 1/2 in an ideal cipher. The way
the inputs and outputs may be related is using the XOR operation. For example,
P1 ⊕ P5 ⊕ C 2 = K 3
When the linear approximation equations are obtained, using the given known plaintexts,
the key bits can be extracted based on those equations.
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2.5
2.5.1

Standardized Well-Known Block Ciphers
Data Encryption Standard (DES)

The Data Encryption Standard DES is one example of symmetric “private” key block ciphers.
DES was selected by the National Institute of Standards and Technology to be used in
encrypting all governmental documents in 1977. It was standardized as an official Federal
information standard (FIPS 46). DES was designed by IBM and the National Security
Agency (NSA), and was considered secure until 1999 when it was broken in 22 hours and 15
minutes, due to its small size key [19], [20], [25]. The algorithm was originally designed with
a 64-bit input (Plaintext) and a 64-bit output (ciphertext) with a 56-bit key, and consisted
of sixteen identical rounds. The general structure of DES encryption is shown in Fig. 2.9.
DES encryption consists of the following phases:
1. Initial Permutation.
2. Rounds 1 through 16.
3. Final Permutation.
Each round needs a different 48-bit key that is generated by the round key generator which
takes the 56-bit key as its input. In the following, we discuss each phase in detail, but first
the DES round key generator will be introduced.
DES Round Key Generator
The round key generator is an important phase of DES, because it is responsible for generating sixteen unique keys, one key for each round. The input of the DES round key generator
is the general 56-bit key and the output is the sixteen 48-bit round keys.
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Figure 2.9. DES Encryption
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A figure of the DES round key generator is shown in Fig. 2.10, the general 64-bit key is
minimized to 56 bits by removing the parity bit of each byte (i.e., bits 8, 16, 24,...64), then
a 1-1 permutation is done. The permutation at this phase is changing the bit locations only.
To generate the first round key, the 56-bit permutated input will be divided into two parts,
each of 28 bits. Each of these 28 bits are shifted to the left by one bit, then both part enter
to a compression permutation box (i.e., some bits are dropped after the permutation). The
48-bit output of the compression P-Box is the first round key. The second key is generated
by taking the previous input of the compression P-Box and repeating the same process. The
same process is repeated to generate all of the sixteen keys.
Permutations
The initial and final permutation phases take a block input of 64 bits and generate an output
block of the same size. The permutation is a process of changing the locations of the bits
without changing the values of the bits, this process is 1-1 bit mapping as shown in Fig.
2.11. The permutation is done based on a permutation table.

Figure 2.11. Initial and Final Permutation

Rounds 1 through 16
Each round takes a block input of 64 bits that is cascaded from the output of the previous
round. Thus the input of the first round is the output of the initial permutation phase, while
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the output of round 16 is the input for the final permutation phase. Each round requires
a unique 48-bit key that is generated by the DES round key generator, which we described
earlier. All the 16 rounds have the same function. A block diagram of the DES round
structure is shown in Fig. 2.12.
As shown in the figure, at the beginning of each round the 64-bit block is divided into
two parts, left and right each, of 32 bits. The right part is taken exactly as the left 32-bit
output of the same round, while the left part of the output is XOR-ed with the 32-bit output
of the F-Box. The F-Box takes the right 32 bits input of the round and the 48-bit round
key as its inputs.

32- bits

32- bits

Li

Ri

32- bits
Round Key
48-bits

F-Box

XOR

32- bits

Lo

Ro
32- bits

32- bits

Figure 2.12. DES Round Structure

F-Box
We used the notation “F-Box” to describe the DES function, which is a function of the 48-bit
round key and the right 32-bit half of the round input f (Ri , Ki ). A block diagram of the
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F-Box structure is shown in Fig. 2.13. As shown in the figure the round key is XOR-ed with
the output of the expansion box (P-Box), which has the right 32 bits round input as its input
and expands it to 48 bits output. The 48-bit result of the XOR operation is the input for the
S-Box. The 32-bit output of the S-Box phase is then permutated through 1-1 mapping (the
same way as the initial and final permutation phases but with a new permutation table).
32 -bits

P-Box
48 -bits
48 -bits
Round key

XOR

48 -bits

S-Boxes
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

32 -bits

1-1 Permutation

32 -bits
Figure 2.13. F-Box Structure

Expansion (P-Box)
The expansion box is a 32-48 permutation box, in which 1 bit is mapped to one or two bits.
The 32-bit input of the P-Box is mapped to a 48-bit output. The 32-bit input frame is divided
into eight sub-frames each of four bits, and each sub-frame is mapped into a new sub-frame
of six bits, which makes the output frame equal to 48 bits. The P-Box mapping is shown in
Fig. 2.14, where the four bits of the input sub-frame are mapped into the four middle bits
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of the output sub-frame, while the last bit of the previous input sub-frame is mapped to the
first bit of the current output sub-frame, and the first bit of the next sub-frame is mapped
to the last bit of the current output sub-frame.

Figure 2.14. P-Box mapping

S-Box
The S-Box phase is the most responsible part for the bit mixing in DES. The 48-bit input
frame of the S-Box phase is divided into eight sub-frames each of six bits. Each of the
sub-frames is an input to one of the eight S-Boxes. Each S-Box takes an input of six bits
and generates an output of four bits, and uses a 4×16 table for the mapping. The tables are
efficiently filled, the effect of which is presented in the following chapters. The four middle
bits of the six input bits are used as an index for the column in the mapping table and the
two bits on the edges are used as an index for the row. Therefore, when any S-Box has an
input, the input is mapped to an entry in the table and the value in the table is the output
of the S-Box. An example for one of the eight S-Box mappings is shown in Fig. 2.15. In the
figure, the input for S-Box number one is 001011. The middle bits are 0101, which refers to
the fifth column, while the edge bits are 01 which refers to the second row. So, the output is
the entry at the intersection of the fifth column with the second row as shown in the figure.
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Figure 2.15. S-Box #1 mapping

Table 2.3. Weak Keys

Keys before parities drop (64 bits) Actual keys (56 bits)
0101 0101 0101 0101
0000000 0000000
1F1F 1F1F 0E0E 0E0E
0000000 FFFFFFF
E0E0 E0E0 F1F1 F1F1
FFFFFFF 0000000
FEFE FEFE FEFE FEFE
FFFFFFF FFFFFFF

Table 2.4. Semi-Weak Keys

Keys before parities drop (64 bits)
Actual keys (56 bits)
01FE 01FE 01FE 01FE
FE01 FE01 FE01 FE01
1FE0 1FE0 0EF1 0EF1
E01F E01F F10E F10E
01E0 01E0 01F0 01F0
E001 E001 F101 F101
1FFE 1FFE 0EFE 0EFE
FE1F FE1F FE0E FE0E
011F 011F 010E 010E
1F01 1F01 0E01 0E01
E0FE E0FE F1FE F1FE
FEE0 FEE0 FEF1 FEF1

Security of DES
The secrecy of any algorithm is measured by the strength of the algorithm against attacks.
This means that in order for an encryption algorithm to be secure, the attacker should not
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have the ability to know the secret encrypted data. Therefore, the attacker should not be
able to benefit from having the ciphertext in knowing the original plaintext or guessing the
key. The main types of attacks are discussed in the following subsections.
Brute force attack
The brute force attack is an example of a ciphertext only attack in which the attacker tries
all possible keys to decrypt the data. At the early stages of DES design, the designers and
researchers thought that the DES algorithm would be secure against this attack since the
key size is 56 bits; it was thought that trying all the possible keys, which are 256 different
keys, would be impossible in a reasonable amount of time given the computer capabilities
at that time. Today a regular computer with one processor can check up to a million keys
in one second, which means over two thousand years would be required to check all the
possible keys. Although a computer with million chips (parallel processing) today can test
all the keys in much less than 20 hours, a computer with these capabilities in 1977 would
have needed many millions of hours, and as a result the algorithm was considered secure
until it was cracked in 1999 in only 22 hours [19], [26].
Weak keys
There are also a number of keys called weak keys because they generate sixteen similar round
keys. These keys are shown in Table 1.3. Some keys, called the semi-weak keys, generate
only two distinct round keys rather than sixteen, where each of these two keys is repeated
eight times. The keys are listed in Table 1.4. Another type of weak key is called a “possible
weak key”. There are 48 keys that create four distinct round keys rather than sixteen, where
each of these keys is repeated four times [19], [27].
Differential Cryptanalysis
Differential Cryptanalysis attack was introduced by Eli Biham and Adi Shamir as a type of
known plaintext attack. The attack idea supposes that the attacker gains access to one of
the communication party’s computers, and gets a number of pairs of plaintexts and their
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corresponding ciphertexts from the victim’s database (Known Plaintext Attack).
In this type of attack, the attacker analyzes the relationship between the different plaintexts
and analyzes their propagation within the ciphertexts. In 1991, this attack was successful
in breaking the full 16 rounds of DES using 247 pairs with a probability of 2−47.2 and a
complexity of 237 encryption and decryption operation [21], [28].

2.5.2

Triple DES (3-DES)

General Design
To solve the problem of security in DES, the 3-DES algorithm was proposed. The new algorithm decrypted the original ciphertext of DES using a new 56-bit key and again encrypted
the result with a new 56-bit key. Therefore, three stages with three different keys are introduced. The total key size is hence 168 bits long, which makes it secure against brute force
attack. Fig. 2.16 shows the general design of the 3-DES algorithm.

Figure 2.16. 3-DES General Design
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In some cases where a lower security level is required, the first and third key can be the
same, therefore the total key length is 112 bits in this case.
Security of 3-DES
As we stated earlier, 3-DES is secure against brute force attack due to the fact that it uses a
key length of either 112 or 168 bits. Which makes it impossible to guess the key through an
exhaustive search on any of today’s fastest supercomputers. However, the best differential
cryptanalysis attack applied to 3-DES was shown to need 232 pairs. Although the complexity
of this attack is 2112 which makes the procedure impractical to break, it is still less than the
complexity of an exhaustive search which has a complexity of 2168 [19], [29].

2.5.3

Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)

The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) was announced in December 2001 by the National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) as its new symmetric key block cipher. After
DES was broken, NIST sought for a replacement specifying that the new algorithm should
have a block size of 128 bits and different key sizes of the set 128, 192, and 256 bits.
In October 2000 NIST announced that the Rijndael algorithm was selected out of the 21
proposed algorithm to be the AES, and AES was finally standardized later in December
2001 and published as FIPS 197 [30]. The general architecture of AES is shown in Fig. 2.17.
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Figure 2.17. AES general architecture

The plaintext and ciphertext are both 128-bit blocks. AES works in three modes, and
each mode has a different key length and different number of rounds. The first mode has a
key of 128 bits and 10 rounds, the second mode has a key of 192 bits and 12 rounds, while
the third mode has a key of 256 bits and 14 rounds.
AES round structure
Each round consists of four different types of bit transformations except for the last round,
which has only three of the transformations. The transformations are sub-bytes, shift rows,
mix columns, and add round key transformations. The last round misses the mix columns
transformation, while the pre-round transformation only uses the add round key transformation. Figure 2.18 shows a block diagram for the general structure of AES round.
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Figure 2.18. AES round structure

The input and output for each transformation is called a state, and each state is a 128-bit
block represented by a row matrix of sixteen bytes as shown in the Fig. 2.19.
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Figure 2.19. AES state

Sub-byte transformation
The sub-byte transformation is the first step in any round. The state is transformed to a new
state, byte by byte. Each byte is transformed into another byte using the transformation
table; the byte is taken as two hexadecimal digits, where the left digit defines the row
number and the right digit defines the column number, and the table is the same as the
S-Box transformation table except that it is 16 × 16 and the inputs of the table are from
00 − F F . The mapping is done based on the table shown in Fig. 2.20. Assume that the
first byte of the input block (state) has the hexadecimal value of 6E. Then we look into the
value at the intersection of row 6 with column E. The output is 9F . Thus, the first byte of
the output state is replaced with 9F .
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Figure 2.20. AES S-Box

Shift row transformation
The input state for the shift row transformation stage is the output state of the sub-byte
transformation stage. In this stage, the byte rows of each state are shifted by a specific
number; the first row is not shifted, the second row is shifted by one byte, the third row is
shifted by two bytes, and the fourth row is shifted by three bytes.
Mix Column transformation
While the shift row stage works on the row level of the states, the mix column stage works
on the column level. It converts each column of the current state to a new column by matrix
multiplication of the column by a constant column matrix. The multiplication of the bytes
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is done in GF(28 ) with modulus (10001101).
Add round key transformation
This stage as well transforms each column of the current state to a new column by XORing
each of the columns with its corresponding key word to produce the new column.
AES key generation
As introduced in the previous section, each round needs a round key that is used in the bit
transformation. Therefore, the number of keys needed are more than the number of rounds
by one, because each round in addition to the pre-round needs a round key. For example, if
we take the 128-bit key size, the 128 bits are divided into four words ( a word is 32 bits),
and these words are numbered from 0 to 3. These words are used in producing the 44 words
needed for all rounds ( 4 words × 11 rounds). The pre-round stage key consists of the words
0-3, the first round key consists of the words 4-7, and so on until the last round key consists
of the words 40-43. The mechanism by which the 44 words are generated is shown in Fig.
2.21.

Figure 2.21. AES Key Generation
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The words t4 , t8 , .... are called temporary words; they are generated from some bit manipulations starting with constant words for each round.
AES security
Brute Force Attack
It was stated earlier that DES was vulnerable to brute force attack, because 256 key trials
can be done on today’s computer within a reasonable amount of time. On the other hand, if
AES is to broken using this attack, the process of breaking it needs 2128 key trials, and this
is impossible on any of today’s computers. If the time needed to break DES is t seconds,
the time needed to break AES is t × 2128−56 = t × 272 seconds.
Differential Cryptanalysis
AES was designed after DES was attacked, and due to the fact that DES was known to
be insecure to this attack, AES was designed in such a way that is prone to differential
cryptanalysis. Given that the attacker has access to any number of plaintext-ciphertext
pairs no one was able to crack the algorithm using this attack yet. However, some versions
of AES with less number of rounds were attacked using differential cryptanalysis. Table
1.5 shows the number of pairs required to break simpler versions of AES along with the
complexity of each attack. Although these attacks takes less time than an exhaustive search,
those attacks are still impractical due to the difficulty of obtaining all the pairs, and a time
complexity that is more than 270 is considered unfeasible. We can also notice that for the 9
rounds version, a lower number of pairs are needed, but they are supposed to be generated
by related keys rather than random keys [31], [32].

2.6

Previous Work on Joint Error Correction and Encryption

The property of avalanche effect in modern block ciphers has a catastrophic effect in wireless
communication channels. Due to the noise, interference, and fading introduced by wireless
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channels, the encrypted data is received with some amount of error, and because of the strict
avalanche effect, the decryption process results in half the original data to be decrypted in
error. This problem attracted a lot of researchers due to its great impact and effect on the
performance of encryption over wireless channels and hence various wireless applications.
One approach that is used to solve the problem is to implement new, smart, and efficient
coding techniques to eliminate the effect of the error caused by the channel at the receiver
side, while another approach is to focus on the encryption algorithm itself by redesigning its
components, in such a way to reduce the avalanche effect and compensate for the security
using new entities and designs.

2.6.1

High Diffusion Cipher

This work was introduced in 2006 [33], and is a 10 rounds cipher based on picking some steps
from the AES standard such as the S-Box and key mixing stages. However, the authors added
a new stage to the first 9 rounds called the HD-encode stage. The HD-encode stage is based
on a column multiplication of the previous state by a given 4 × 4 matrix for rounds 1 to 7
and a 7 × 4 matrix for rounds eight and nine. Those matrices were found to have less error
propagation than the column multiplication stage of AES. The authors results outperforms
AES in terms of error performance. However, the security of their design is less secure than
AES (although their design is considered secure because, although it takes time less than an

Table 2.5. Differential Cryptanalysis on Weaker versions of AES

AES version
key Size
AES (6 Rounds)
any
AES (6 Rounds)
any
AES (7 Rounds)
192
AES (7 Rounds)
256
AES (8 Rounds)
192
AES (8 Rounds)
256
AES (9 Rounds)
256

Required Number of Pairs Time Complexity
232
272
6 · 232
244
32
19 · 2
2155
21 · 232
2172
2128
2188
2128
2204
85
2 RK
2224
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exhaustive search, it can’t be broken in a feasible amount of time). On the other hand, the
algorithm is less efficient in terms of energy consumption than AES.

2.6.2

The Pyramid Cipher

This cipher encrypts a 128-bit plaintext into a 192 bit ciphertext using a 129-bit key [34]. It
consists of five successive rounds, with each round consisting of three different stages. The
key mixing and the substitution stages are identical to those of AES. However, the third
stage consists of a column multiplication with a fixed 16 × 16 array for the first three rounds,
and a 16 × 24 array for the remaining two rounds. The algorithm is shown to have an
improved performance over AES when convolutional coding is concatenated to it. However,
without the use of coding the pyramid algorithm performs similar to AES in terms of error
performance. On the other hand, the time required for encryption and decryption is much
greater than that required by AES. The authors shows that their algorithm is resistant to
differential cryptanalysis attack by proving that it takes more than an exhaustive search to
attack their algorithm.

2.6.3

Expanded Cipher Feedback Mode of Operation (ECFB)

In this work the author introduced a new mode of operation to be used with symmetric-key
encryption algorithms [6]. The new mode is called expanded-cipher feedback mode. The
author compared the error performance of using the new mode of operation with using traditional modes of operations such as the output feedback mode (OFB), cipher feedback mode
(CFB), and the cipher chaining mode (CBC). The use of the proposed mode of operation
improves the performance of the received information. The security of the new mode is well
investigated and the new mode is shown to be secure against applicable types of attacks.
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2.6.4

Qusai-Cyclic Low-Density Parity Check (QC-LDPC) Code
based Encryption

In this work the authors introduced a new joint encryption and channel coding scheme, based
on the use of quasi-cyclic low-density parity-check (QC-LDPC) codes with a symmetric-key
secure encryption algorithm [3]. The proposed scheme utilizes a specific form of error vectors
(perturbation vectors) that can be calculated from a random syndrome by the sender and
receiver. The algorithm was proposed for the computation of the error vectors based on
the right inverse of the parity-check matrix of the code. The proposed system provides an
efficient error performance, an acceptable level of security and a low-complexity, practical
implementation.

2.6.5

Turbo Codes Based Encryption

This work proposes a joint error correction and encryption scheme based on turbo codes [4].
Two inter leavers are used where the original inter leaver of turbo coding is used with some
improvements to make it controlled by a secret key. Another inter leaver that is controlled by
another key is added at the first output of the turbo encoder. The authors showed that the
proposed algorithm slightly improves the error performance in a small range of signal-to-ratio
(SNR), compared to the use of traditional turbo codes.

2.6.6

McEliece Public Key Cryptosystem

McEliece Cryptosystem is the first public encryption algorithm, it was developed in 1978
by Robert McEliece [35]. It was the first algorithm to use randomization in the encryption
process, the algorithm is based on the hardness of decoding a general linear code (NP-hard
problem). This algorithm has many advantages over the RSA algorithm. The encryption
and decryption are faster, and the security grows rapidly with the increase of the key size.
The algorithm in its original format was not popular and never gained much acceptance
in the cryptography community. The algorithm uses variable size random permutation and
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substitution matrices. Some modifications to this algorithm were shown to have an improved
error performance. However, most of those systems suffered from many security problems
[36], [37], [38].

2.6.7

Kaks D-sequences

The author proposed an approach for joint encryption and error correction based on decimal
expansion of fractions known as D-sequences [39]. In his work, he shows that using the
proposed encoding operation is equivalent to using RSA encryption algorithm in terms of
security. However, the complexity of the algorithm was high.

2.6.8

Godoy and Pereira Scheme

The purpose of this work was to alleviate the effect of the error in the communication channel
without actually modifying or changing the encryption algorithm [40]. The algorithm derives
new generator matrices from the original ones by row permutation. However, the number
of generators were countable and finite, so the system was not immune against brute-force
attacks.

2.6.9

Hwang and Rao Scheme

The authors proposed a new private-key encryption algorithm that is error correcting. The
algorithm was based on non-linear channel coding [41]. However, the algorithm needed large
parameters to reduce the error which increases the complexity of such an algorithm. The
algorithm was shown to be vulnerable to some types of attacks.

2.6.10

Cryptocoding

This technique is based on quasigroup string transformation. In this technique, 16 orders
of quasigroup are chosen over 2480 possibilities when the encoding functions are generated.
This system achieves both error correction and security, at the cost of complexity, because
the decoding process it is extremely complicated [42].
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2.7

Modified Data Encryption Standard (M-DES)

M-DES was introduced as a modification to the data encryption standard [7], by which the
error performance is improved and the security is enhanced compared to DES. In general,
the design of M-DES is very similar to the design of the data encryption standard, which is
a symmetric encryption algorithm except in the S-Box, and by introducing a new round we
call Round 17, which has its own key that is different from the original DES 56-bit key.

2.7.1

Structure and Design

M-DES has two main modifications to the standard DES. First the number of distinct
mapping tables is reduced from eight to two only. In addition, a new round 17 with a new
80-bit key is added to the original 16 rounds. The general design of the new algorithm is
shown in Figure 2.22.

Figure 2.22. Design of the modified DES algorithm (M-DES)
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S-Boxes
The S-Box is mainly responsible for the shuffling of the bits. A careful design of the S-Box
will result in an avalanche effect of 0.5, which produces a secure cipher [2], [1]. However, to
reduce the error in M-DES, the first four S-Boxes uses a similar mapping tables which are
the same as the first mapping table of the standard DES, while the fifth through the eighth
S-Boxes use similar mapping tables that are the same as the fourth S-Box mapping table in
the standard DES.
Round 17
The motive for the second modification is in fact coming from the work in [21], where the
authors showed that DES can be cracked using the differential cryptanalysis attack if the
attacker has 247 pairs of plaintext and ciphertext. The authors also showed that each distinct
S-Box mapping table requires around 26.5 pairs to be cracked. Therefore, in our proposed MDES, while using only two distinct mapping tables (rather than the eight distinct mapping
tables in the standard DES), the number of pairs needed to crack the algorithm reduces
to 213 pairs. To overcome this security reduction, a new round is introduced in M-DES.
By introducing round 17, the algorithm becomes in fact secure to both brute force and
differential cryptanalysis attacks as will be shown later in this section. Round 17 has two
inputs and one output, the two inputs are the 64-bit output of the final permutation stage
and an 80-bit key; the output is the 128-bit cipher. The 80-bit key is used to map the 64-bit
input of Round 17 to a 128-bit output. This mapping procedure is shown in Fig. 2.23 where
the 64-bit input of round 17 is divided into sixteen sub-frames of four bits each and the 80bit key is divided into 16 sub-keys, each of five bits, while the 128-bit output consists of 32
sub-frames of four bits each. Each five bits of the 80-bit key is used to map one of the 4-bit
input sub-frames to one 4-bit output sub-frame. So the input sub-frames will be scrambled
randomly in 16 out of the 32 output sub-frames according to the key. The remaining 16
sub-frames of the output are randomly filled with zeros and ones. For example, suppose the
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first 5 bits of the key are 00101. This means that the first 4-bit sub-frame of the input will
be mapped to the fifth 4-bit sub-frame of the output. At the destination, the receiver is
assumed to have the 80-bit key, so it will be able to recover the useful 64-bit ciphertext out
of the total 128-bit received ciphertext.
In summary, the proposed algorithm has a plaintext of 64 bits, an overall ciphertext of
128 bits, and an overall key of 136 bits.

Figure 2.23. Round 17 Design, mapping the 16 input sub-frames into the 32 output sub-frames using the 80-bit
key

2.7.2

Security Analysis

The security of M-DES encryption algorithm is measured by the attacker’s ability to crack
it. There are five general types of attacks that may be applied to any encryption algorithm:
ciphertext only, known plaintext, chosen plaintext, chosen ciphertext, and chosen text attacks. However, in symmetric block cipher algorithms the first and second types are the
most applicable attacks, so we analyze the effect of the brute force attack on our proposed
algorithm as an example for the first type of attack and the differential cryptanalysis as an
example for the second type of attack.
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Resistance to Brute Force Attack
The brute Force Attack is based on trying all possible keys in decrypting some ciphertext
that the attacker obtains, until he finds a reasonable or expected plaintext, and thus that
specific key is the correct key that was used in encryption and decryption.
When DES was originally designed it was impossible to think about this kind of attacks.
Trying 256 different keys was not feasible and impossible because it would take an infinite
amount of time. However, this mission has become easier, because with a multi processor
computer an attacker can check all 256 keys in less than 20 hours. In the new algorithm
the key length becomes 56 + 80 = 136 bits, which produces immunity against the brute
force attack because 2136 keys will need to be tested in order for an intruder to break the
algorithm using this attack, a task that cannot be accomplished on any of today’s computers.
Furthermore, assuming that the key of DES can be cracked in 1 second (testing all 256 keys),
the key of the new algorithm needs more than 100 trillion years to be cracked.
Resistance to Differential Cryptanalysis
The differential cryptanalysis attack was introduced by Eli Biham and Adi Shamir as a type
of known plaintext attack. The attack idea supposes that the attacker gains access to one
of the communication party’s computer, and gets a number of pairs of plaintexts and their
corresponding ciphertexts from the victim’s database. In this type of attack, the attacker
analyzes the relationship between the different plaintext and analyze their propagation at
the ciphertexts. It has been shown that 247 pairs of < plaintext, ciphertext > is enough to
break DES using this attack.
In M-DES, the reduction of the number of S-Boxes from 8 to 2, has reduced the number of
pairs needed to crack the algorithm using differential cryptanalysis from 247 to 213 . However,
in DES if those 247 pairs are available, the algorithm can be cracked in a specific amount
of time. On the other hand, if the 213 pairs are available in M-DES, the intruder can not
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use those pairs directly. The useful 64-bit ciphertext1 will need to be extracted out of the
128-bit cipher for each of the 213 pairs. Therefore, the probability of obtaining one useful
pair out of the 213 pairs is given by
1
p =  
= 7.9515 × 10−23 .
32
× 16!
16

(2.7.1)

And the experiment of guessing the useful ciphers and their correct order for all the N = 213
ciphers is a bernoulli trial (repeating the experiment N times out N ciphers). Therefore, the
probability of a successful attack on M-DES using differential cryptanalysis is given by
Pattack

 
N N
=
p (1 − p)N −N
N
= 3.011 × 10−181040
≈ 0.

(2.7.2)

This probability is vanishes to zero, so the algorithm is considered immune to differential
cryptanalysis.
Another way to look at the possibility of attacking the algorithm using the differential
cryptanalysis is to calculate the required time needed to do so. The number of trials an
attacker needs to perform to achieve a successful attack is
Ntrials

 
213
32
=
× 16!
16
= 7.7 × 10172825 trials.

(2.7.3)

However, the fastest super computer today can perform 2.5 × 1012 operations per second.
Therefore, the total time needed to attack M-DES using differential cryptanalysis is given
1

A useful ciphertext is the 64-bit cipher that was scrambled in the 128-bit cipher. This process will
make the intruders task harder, because the likelihood of guessing the correct 16 sub-frames out of the 32
sub-frames in a feasible time is very low.
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by
Tattack =

7.7 × 10172825
2.5 × 1012

= 3.08 × 10172813 seconds
= 1 × 10172806 years

(2.7.4)

which is about 14400 trillion years.

2.7.3

Error Performance in the Wireless Channel

In this section we evaluate the performance of the proposed algorithm in wireless channels, in
terms of its error performance in these channels. Two scenarios are assumed: in one channel
scenario the channel is assumed to expose additive white gaussian noise (AWGN), and in
the other scenario, the channel expose AWGN in addition to Nakagami-m fading. Both
scenarios are analyzed next. We also analyze the performance of the use of one asymmetric
encryption algorithm in Appendix A
Performance in AWGN Channels
Computer simulations are used to evaluate the performance of the proposed algorithm assuming AWGN wireless communication channel with binary phase shift keying (BPSK)
modulation. A large sequence of bits (one million bits in our simulation experiments) is
generated randomly at the sender. The generated bits are then divided into 64-bit blocks
each encrypted into a 128-bit block cipher using our proposed M-DES. The ciphers are then
transmitted over the channel. The received ciphers are then decrypted block by block at the
destination. The resulting sequence of bits at the receiver after decryption is compared with
the sequence of bits at the sender before encryption, and the error is calculated for different
SNR values of the channel. This same simulation procedure is repeated for DES as well.
In Fig. 2.24, we investigate the performance payoff from increasing or decreasing the
security level by having four (increased security) or one (reduced security) distinct mapping
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tables, respectively, rather than two distinct mapping tables (case of Fig. 2.26). It can be
inferred from the figure that having one distinct mapping table results in an enhanced BER
performance while having four distinct mapping tables degrades the BER performance. Fig.
2.25, shows the relationship between the BER before and after decryption for both DES and
M-DES. It is clear from the figure that all versions of M-DES (1, 2, and 4 distinct mapping
tables) outperform DES. It is also clear that M-DES in its two and one distinct S-Boxes
mapping tables versions outperforms the use of the mode of operation described in [6].
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Figure 2.24. BER vs. SNR in AWGN channel with BPSK modulation, comparison of AES, DES vs. different
modes of M-DES
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operation. BERin is the error at the receiver before decryption(imposed by channel noise only) while BERout is
the error after decryption.

Performance in Nakagami-m Fading Channels
Computer simulations are used to evaluate the performance of the proposed algorithm assuming an AWGN wireless communication channel with fading and BPSK modulation. We
assume Nakagami-m fading (with Rayleigh as a special case when m = 1). The same procedure as in the previous sub-section is repeated, with the assumption that fading is affecting
the signal in addition to gaussian noise.
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Figure 2.26. BER vs. SNR assuming AWGN channel and Nakagami-m fading channel with BPSK modulation,
comparison of the BER when DES and M-DES algorithms are used, the effect of not using encryption is also
compared with DES and M-DES encryption algorithms

Fig. 2.26 depicts the BER performance versus the average SNR per bit for both M-DES
and DES assuming AWGN channel and Nakagami-m fading channel and BPSK modulation.
The results in the figure cover the cases when no fading and fading exists for different values
of m. We also plotted the curves when no encryption is used as a reference. It should be
clear that in Fig. 2.26 the BER of DES is constant (avalanche) between -5 to 2 dB in AWGN
and -5 to 10 in Rayliegh (i.e: Rayliegh is a spacial case of Nakagami-m when m = 1). On
the other hand, these errors will result in less than half the bits to be in error (no avalanche)
when M-DES is used. It can be clearly noticed from the figure that the BER increases when
m decreases as expected, because the channel conditions are worse due to the large amount
of fading. Also it is obvious from the figure that the performance gain obtained by M-DES
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becomes larger when the fading is more severe (e.g., m = 1, m = 0.5).
It should be noted here that M-DES uses 64 extra bits in the cipher as compared to DES,
which results in half rate loss in system throughput. This is in fact the cost paid for the gain
in the error performance and security level obtained by our proposed algorithm as compared
to DES.

2.8

Conclusion

In this chapter we presented the main well-known encryption algorithms, we also introduced
the state of the art in the area of joint encryption and error correction techniques in wireless
channels. In the next chapter, we are studying the effect of each distinct S-Box mapping
table and each round on the error performance and on the security.
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Chapter 3
The Effect of the Number of Rounds
and S-Box Mapping Tables in
Symmetric Encryption Algorithms
3.1

Introduction

The number of rounds and S-Boxes in any symmetric cryptosystem plays a great role on its
security as well as on the probability of correct reception at the receiver after decryption.
This work considers a class of symmetric encryption algorithms based on the data encryption
standard (DES) and sheds lights into understanding the effect of each the number of rounds
and number of S-Boxes on the security of the encrypted data as well as on the probability
of correct reception in the wireless channel. In wireless channels, some encrypted bits could
be flipped while transmitted over the channel due to noise, interference or fading. This
degradation in the wireless channel conditions causes the data after decryption to have some
amount of error that depends on the number of bits in error received in the encrypted data,
before decryption, and on the location of these bits in the cipher block. We consider the
number of rounds, the number of S-Boxes and the channel conditions (in terms of signalto-noise power ratio (SNR)); and study their effect on security level and detection error
performance. Using numerical computations and computer simulations, when considering
a certain encryption mechanism, we present qualitative and quantitative analysis on the
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tradeoff between communication reliability and security levels versus the fluctuations in the
wireless channel conditions.

3.2

Motivation

The importance of this work is due to the fact that we need to understand the effect of
each S-Box and each round on the probability of correct reception at the receiver as well as
on the security of the encrypted data. These effects are studied in wireless environment to
clearly understand the effect of the number of S-Boxes and rounds in wireless communication
channels.

3.3

Contributions

In this chapter, we study how the error performance and the security are affected by each
distinct S-Box mapping table and by each round. The effect on the error performance is
studied assuming different signal-to-noise values, which implies different channel conditions,
therefore, the uniqueness of this analysis is due to the fact that it has been evaluated based on
the number of rounds, the number of S-Boxes and the channel conditions. On the other hand,
we show that the security analysis in this chapter is independent of the channel conditions
and is a function of the number of rounds and S-Boxes only.

3.4

Effect of the number of rounds and S-Boxes on the
error performance

In this section we evaluate the effect of number of rounds and S-Boxes in different channel
conditions (i.e., different SNR values) on the probability of correct reception for both DES
and M-DES.

55

3.4.1

The Effect on DES Error Performance

Given that the probability of correct reception is evaluated based on three different factors
(i.e., number of rounds, number of S-Boxes and the SNR), we assume three different scenarios
in our analysis:
1. Fixing the number of S-Boxes and changing the number of rounds and the SNR
2. Fixing the SNR and changing the number of S-Boxes and the number of rounds

Probability of correct reception

3. Fixing the number of rounds and changing the number of S-Boxes and the SNR

S NR ( d

m
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o
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e
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Figure 3.1. The effect of the number of rounds and SNR on the probability of correct reception for a fixed
number of distinct S-Boxes equal to eight
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Figure 3.2. The effect of the number of rounds and SNR on the probability of correct reception for a fixed
number of distinct S-Boxes equal to four

Figures 3.1 - 3.4 show different simulation results for the first scenario where the number of
S-Boxes is fixed to eight, four, two and one in Figures 3.1, 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4, respectively. It
can be noticed from Figure 3.1, where the number of S-Boxes is eight, the number of rounds
is changed from 1 to 16 and the SNR is changed from -5 to 20 dB, that the area bordered by
SNR values from -5 to 5 dB and 16 to 12 rounds represents the Strict avalanche effect (SAC)
area, because the probability of correct reception within this area is equal to 0.5. However,
if we move to an area outside this range for example 8 rounds with an SNR equal to 0 dB,
the probability of correct reception increases to 0.57. In general, we can conclude that when
the number of rounds decreases, the probability of correct reception increases and when the
SNR value increases the probability of correct reception will increase as well, as expected.
The effect of these changes on the security of the encrypted data will be analyzed in the next
section. Figures 3.5 - 3.8 show different simulation results for the second scenario where the
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Figure 3.3. The effect of the number of rounds and SNR on the probability of correct reception for a fixed
number of distinct S-Boxes equal to two

SNR is fixed to -5, 0, 5 and 10 dB in Figures 3.5, 3.6, 3.7 and 3.8 respectively. It can be
noticed from Figure 3.5 where the SNR is fixed to -5 dB and the number of rounds is changed
from one to sixteen and the number of S-Boxes is changed from one to eight, that the SAC
is only present when the number of rounds is between twelve and sixteen while the number
of S-Boxes is at eight. It can be clearly noticed from Figures 3.5 - 3.8 that the probability of
correct reception is improved when the number of S-Boxes and rounds decrease. While the
probability of correct reception is enhanced significantly when the SNR is increased, which
can be noticed in Figure 3.8, where the probability of correct reception is always equal to
1, due to the fact the SNR is equal to 10 dB. Therefore, we can also notice that when the
channel conditions are perfect (i.e, SN R ≥ 10 db) the probability of correct reception is
equal to one, for any number of rounds or S-Boxes.
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Figure 3.4. The effect of the number of rounds and SNR on the probability of correct reception for a fixed
number of distinct S-Boxes equal to one

Figures 3.9 - 3.12 depict simulation results for the third scenario where the number of
rounds is fixed and is equal to one, four, eight and twelve rounds in Figures 3.9, 3.10, 3.11
and 3.12, respectively. It can be noticed from Figure 3.9 where the number of rounds is
fixed to one round and the number of S-Boxes is changed from one to eight and the SNR
is changed from -5 to 20 dB, that the SAC is not present in this case, due to the fact that
the number of rounds is equal to the minimum. Similarly, when the number of round is
equal to four and eight in Figures 3.10 and 3.11, the SAC is still not present. However, the
SAC starts to show when the number of rounds is equal to 12. Therefore, we can conclude
that that the SAC is not present in DES until the number of rounds is equal to 12 or more,
regardless of the channel condition and the number of S-Boxes.
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Figure 3.5. The effect of the number rounds and the number of distinct number of S-Box mapping tables on
the probability of correct reception for a fixed SNR equal to -5 dB

By the end of this section, we can notice from the three different simulation scenarios,
that SAC is present only when the following three conditions are present all together
1. The number of S-Boxes is eight
2. The number of rounds is between 12 and 16
3. The SNR value is between -5 and 5 dB.

3.4.2

The Effect on M-DES Error Performance

By introducing round 17, reducing the number of S-Boxes and changing the design of the
S-Box mapping tables in M-DES, the algorithm is shown to alleviate the SAC under all
circumstances. The number of the S-Box mapping tables in M-DES are two. Therefore, by
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Figure 3.6. The effect of the number rounds and the number of distinct number of S-Box mapping tables on
the probability of correct reception for a fixed SNR equal to 0 dB

alternating the number of rounds in M-DES as well as changing the channel conditions (i.e.,
SNR of the channel), the probability of correct reception will be changed. However, when
the number of rounds is changed, round 17 is still applied after the selected number of the
original rounds to alleviate the SAC effect. To summarize, in this simulation the number of
S-Boxes is fixed to two S-Boxes (M-DES number of S-Boxes) and the probability of correct
reception is computed for every single value of SNR between -5 and 20 dB and for every
different number of rounds between one and sixteen (with round 17 applied in all the cases).
Table 3.1 summarizes the probability of correct reception for the case when the SNR is equal
to -5 dB for different number of rounds from one to sixteen with round 17 applied in all
cases.
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Figure 3.7. The effect of the number rounds and the number of distinct number of S-Box mapping tables on
the probability of correct reception for a fixed SNR equal to 5 dB

It can be noticed from Table 3.1 that the probability of correct reception in M-DES is
significantly improved compared to that of DES for the same number of rounds, S-Boxes
and SNR value. This improvement in the error performance is a result of the change in the
S-Boxes design as well as to the addition of round 17.
Hence, in this section we show that the probability of correct reception in M-DES is
a function of two variables, which are the number of rounds and the SNR. Moreover, we
show that M-DES significantly improves the error performance compared to DES. In the
next section, we show the effect of the number of rounds and S-Boxes on the security of the
encrypted data. In addition, we evaluate the security addition of round 17 to M-DES.
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Figure 3.8. The effect of the number rounds and the number of distinct number of S-Box mapping tables on
the probability of correct reception for a fixed SNR equal to 10 dB

3.5

Effect of the number of rounds and S-Boxes on the
Security

When the security of symmetric encryption algorithms is evaluated, two main attacks are
considered. The Brute force attack where the key is attacked; and the differential or linear
attacks where the actual data is attacked [19]. The number of rounds and S-Boxes does
not have an effect on the brute force attack due to the fact that the brute force attack
is an attack where all possible keys are tried in decryption to get the correct or expected
plaintext. Moreover, the attacker who obtains a ciphertext, tries all possible keys to decrypt
the ciphertext he obtained, until he gets a plaintext that he expects out of the decryption
process. The obtained key can be further used to decrypt all other ciphertext obtained by the
attacker. However, the number of rounds and S-Boxes directly impacts the strength of the
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Figure 3.9. The effect of the number of distinct S-Box mapping tables and SNR on the probability of correct
reception for a fixed number of rounds equal to 1

differential cryptanalysis attack due to the fact that this attack is based on the confusion and
diffusion of the data bits, which are mainly affected by the number of rounds and S-Boxes.
Moreover, the attack assumes that the attacker already have access to a number of plaintexts
and their associated ciphertexts without knowing the key by which they were encrypted. By
having enough number of plaintexts and their associated ciphertexts, the attacker can study
the relationship between each bit of the plaintext and each bit of the ciphertext. It is
assumed that if the enough number of pairs to perform the attack are available, the attacker
can obtain the key immediately. The complexity of the attack increases when the number
of rounds increases and when the operations inside each round gets more complicated [21].
Therefore, the number of rounds and S-Boxes directly impacts the strength of the differential
cryptanalysis attack.
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Figure 3.10. The effect of the number of distinct S-Box mapping tables and SNR on the probability of correct
reception for a fixed number of rounds equal to 4

3.5.1

The Effect on DES Security

In [21] it is shown that when 247 pairs of plaintexts and their associated ciphertexts are
available to the attacker, the key by which these pairs were encrypted can be immediately
obtained. Table 3.2 summarizes the number of pairs required to break the standard DES
when different number of S-Boxes and rounds are selected in DES. For example, if we take
the case where two S-Boxes and sixteen rounds are selected, 213 pairs of plaintext and their
associated ciphertexts are enough to break the algorithm and discover the key, compared to
the case where 247 pairs are required to break the algorithm when eight S-Boxes and sixteen
rounds are selected. Therefore, it can be noticed that increasing the number of rounds and
S-Boxes enhances the security of the encrypted data. In our analysis, we assume that if
the attacker has all the required pairs required to break the algorithm using the differential
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Figure 3.11. The effect of the number of distinct S-Box mapping tables and SNR on the probability of correct
reception for a fixed number of rounds equal to 8

cryptanalysis attack, the algorithm can be broken in zero seconds, and the algorithm is no
longer considered secure. Based on Table 3.1, given that the combination of two rounds/one
S-Box is the least secure and the combination of 16 rounds/8 S-Boxes is the most secure.
Let us define a normalized (w.r.t. the most secure case) security level metric as follows
Sd =

log2 Np
,
log2 Npm

(3.5.1)

where Np is the number of pairs needed to break the algorithm for a given rounds/S-Boxes
combination and Npm is the maximum number of pairs needed to crack the algorithm in the
most secure case, which is equal to 247 pairs. Figure 3.13 shows the relationship between
the number of rounds and the normalized security level Sd for different number of distinct
S-Boxes (using Eq. 3.5.1). It can be noticed from the figure that the security is enhanced
whenever the number of rounds or the number of S-Boxes increase. Therefore, the most
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Figure 3.12. The effect of the number of distinct S-Box mapping tables and SNR on the probability of correct
reception for a fixed number of rounds equal to 12

secure case (Sd = 1) is when we have eight S-Boxes and 16 Rounds (original DES design),
conversely the worst case (Sd = 0) is when we have one S-Box and one round only. However,
DES with its original design (16 rounds and 8 S-Boxes) has been shown to be no longer
considered secure [21], although we show later in this section that its modified version MDES proposed in [7] solves its security problem.

3.5.2

The Effect on M-DES Security

The encryption algorithm proposed in [7] and presented earlier in chapter 2 alleviates the
SAC by reducing the number of S-Boxes from eight to two in addition to modifying the
design of their mapping tables as well as the addition of round 17. However, to overcome
the security reduction due to the dropping of six S-Boxes, the authors introduced a new
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Number of rounds
M-DES
DES

1
0.9
0.79

2
0.89
0.78

3
0.88
0.77

4
0.87
0.76

5
0.86
0.75

6
0.85
0.74

7
0.84
0.7

8
0.83
0.72

9
0.81
0.70

10
0.8
0.69

11
0.78
0.67

12
0.77
0.66

Table 3.1. The probability of correct reception for M-DES (2 S-Boxes) when the SNR is equal to -5 dB and the
number of rounds is varied from one to sixteen, with round 17 applied in all cases of M-DES compared to the
same scenario of DES with two S-Boxes only

round with a new key. In original DES as shown in the previous table, 213 pairs of plaintext
and their associated ciphertext are required to attack the algorithm when two S-Boxes and
sixteen rounds are chosen. However, by the introduction of round 17, the existence and
availability of those pairs is not enough to break the algorithm and obtain the key. This is
due to the fact that the differential cryptanalysis on DES requires both the plaintext and
the ciphertext to be of a length equal to 64 bits. However, in M-DES, the 64-bit cipher is
hidden in a larger 128-bit key. Therefore, assuming that 213 pairs of 64-bit plaintexts and
their associated 128-bit M-DES ciphertext are available to the attacker, the attack can’t be
directly applied until the actual 64-bit cipher is extracted from each 128-bit cipher. Hence, a
new security measure can be defined by the time required to attack the algorithm. Assuming
that the required pairs are available and already extracted, it is further assumed that the key
is obtained immediately. Round 17 in M-DES adds an additional time overhead to perform
the attack, which is the time required to extract the 64-bit useful ciphers from each 128-bit

Number of Rounds
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16

1 S-Box
20
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

2 S-Boxes
20
21
22
24
27
29
211
213

4 S-Boxes
22
23
25
28
214
218
222
227

8 S-Boxes
23
25
28
214
224
231
239
247

Table 3.2. Number of pairs needed to crack DES using differential cryptanalysis for different number of rounds
and S-Boxes in DES
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Nr
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16

1 S-Box
7.9515 × 10−23
7.9515 × 10−23
(7.9515 × 10−23 )2
(7.9515 × 10−23 )4
(7.9515 × 10−23 )8
(7.9515 × 10−23 )16
(7.9515 × 10−23 )32
(7.9515 × 10−23 )64

2 S-Boxes
7.9515 × 10−23
(7.9515 × 10−23 )2
(7.9515 × 10−23 )4
(7.9515 × 10−23 )16
(7.9515 × 10−23 )128
(7.9515 × 10−23 )512
11
(7.9515 × 10−23 )2
13
(7.9515 × 10−23 )2

4 S-Boxes
(7.9515 × 10−23 )4
(7.9515 × 10−23 )8
(7.9515 × 10−23 )32
(7.9515 × 10−23 )128
14
(7.9515 × 10−23 )2
18
(7.9515 × 10−23 )2
22
(7.9515 × 10−23 )2
27
(7.9515 × 10−23 )2

8 S-Boxes
(7.9515 × 10−23 )8
(7.9515 × 10−23 )32
(7.9515 × 10−23 )128
14
(7.9515 × 10−23 )2
24
(7.9515 × 10−23 )2
31
(7.9515 × 10−23 )2
39
(7.9515 × 10−23 )2
47
(7.9515 × 10−23 )2

Table 3.3. The probability of extracting all 64-bit ciphertext from the 128-bit ciphertext of M-DES in [7]

cipher and is called t1 . We find t1 for all the cases described in Table 3.2. Assuming that
the number of pairs given in an entry of Table 3.2 is called NP , therefor the time t1 is given
by
t1 =

(N1 )NP
N2

(3.5.2)

where N1 is the number of operation needed to extract one useful 64-bit cipher out of one
128-bit cipher, which is given by
N1

 
32
=
× 16!
16
= 1.276 × 1022 trials,

(3.5.3)

and N2 is the number of operations that can be performed during one second by the microprocessor. Therefore, Eq. 3.5.2 can be given by
t1 =

(1.276 × 1022 )P
.
N2

(3.5.4)

As a case study, if we take a super computer that is able to run 2.5 × 1012 operations per
second, eq. 3.5.4 can be given by
t1 =

(1.276 × 1022 )P
.
2.5 × 1012

(3.5.5)

For example, if we take the case where we have 10 rounds and 4 S-Boxes, NP = 214 pairs of
plaintext and their associated ciphertexts are required to crack the algorithm, however the
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Figure 3.13. The relationship between the number of rounds and the security level for different different number
of distinct S-Boxes

useful 64-bit ciphertext need to be extracted out of each 128-bit ciphertext. Hence, the time
(in seconds) to extract all the useful 64-bit ciphertexts is given by
t1

(1.276 × 1022 )2
=
2.5 × 1012

14

= 7.236 × 10362169

(3.5.6)

where Nc2 is the number of clock cycles required for each extraction trial which is approximated by 32 clock cycles. Hence the number of clock cycles required is given by
Ncc =

(1.276 × 1022 )P
.
32

(3.5.7)

Another metric that can be used to evaluate the security is the probability of attack given
that all the required pairs are available (before the extraction of the useful ciphertexts), this
probability is assumed to be equal to 1 without the use of round 17 (no ciphertext extraction
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is required). The probability of extracting one useful ciphertext out of a 128-bit cipher is
given by
1
= 7.9515 × 10−23 .
p1 =  
32
× 16!
16

(3.5.8)

The experiment of guessing the useful ciphers and their correct order for all the NP pairs in
M-DES is a bernoulli trial (repeating the experiment N times out NP ciphers). Hence, the
probability of a successful attack on M-DES using differential cryptanalysis is given by
 
NP NP
Pattack =
p1 (1 − p1 )NP −NP
NP
P
= pN
1

= (7.9515 × 10−23 )NP .

(3.5.9)

Therefore, the probability of attack decreases when the number of pairs required in Table
3.2 increase (increased number of rounds and S-Box mapping tables). For example if we
take the same case we discussed earlier of the 10 rounds with four S-Boxes, the probability
of attacking the algorithm (extracting all useful ciphertexts) is given by
14

Pattack = (7.9515 × 10−23 )2

(3.5.10)

which is a very small probability. Table 3.3 summarizes the probability of attack for all cases
described in Table 3.2.
To summarize, in this section we have shown that the security of the encrypted data
decreases when the number of rounds and S-Boxes decreases. We also showed that the
addition of round 17 in M-DES [7] significantly improves the security by increasing the time
required for a successful attack which implies a very low probability of successful attack on
M-DES. In addition, we evaluated the security enchantment of the new round proposed in
M-DES in a more comprehensive way, where we numerically evaluated the probability of a
successful attack on the proposed algorithm as well as calculating the time required for such
an attack.
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3.6

Conclusions

In this chapter we evaluated the effect of the number of rounds and the number of S-Boxes
on the probability of correct reception assuming different channel conditions. In addition,
we also evaluated the effect of the number of rounds and the number of S-Boxes on the
security level of the encrypted data in DES as well as in M-DES. We have shown that
the probability of correct reception is improved when the number of rounds and S-Boxes
is decreased. Moreover, we have shown that the security of the encryption algorithm is
enhanced when the number of rounds and S-Boxes is increased. We have also evaluated
the security enhancement of the new round proposed in M-DES in a more comprehensive
way, where we numerically evaluated the probability of a successful attack on the proposed
algorithm as well as calculating the time required for such an attack. We have shown that
the time to achieve a successful attack on M-DES is tremendously high given that a very
fast super computer is used in the attack, which implies an insignificant probability of such
an attack on M-DES.
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Chapter 4
Adaptive M-DES: A Trade-Off
between Security and Throughput
4.1

Introduction

Encryption in wireless channels is becoming more and more important and challenging process. Encrypted information might encounter some amount of error at the receiver side due
to SAC. In [3]-[5] the authors developed effective coding schemes and mechanisms in the
physical layer, in order to correct and minimize the errors caused by the channel. While
in [6], [8] the authors were more focused on inventing and implementing new encryption
algorithms that encounter less error propagation, and hence alleviating the SAC. In [6] a
new mode of operation is used with the use of DES to transmit the encrypted data over
the wireless channel. While in M-DES introduced earlier, a new encryption algorithm is
introduced, which is a modification to the Data Encryption Standard (DES) and is shown
to outperform the standard DES when implemented in wireless channels, moreover, the proposed algorithm is shown to outperform the used mode of operation in [6]. In [8], the authors
developed an optimized framework for encryption over wireless channels using the Rijndael
algorithm. The proposed mechanism in [8] is mainly based on using longer block and key
sizes whenever the channel conditions are better.
In this chapter we use the mechanism presented in [8] and apply it to an adaptive variable
block size version of the modified DES. The proposed algorithm has variable key and cipher
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sizes rather than the fixed 136-bit key and 128-bit cipher used in M-DES. Analytical results
are used to show that the proposed algorithm outperforms the use of Rijndael as well as the
256-bit AES algorithm, in terms of throughput for a fixed required security level.

4.2

Motivation

A secure encryption algorithm could be designed with a very large block and key sizes to
ensure the secrecy of the encrypted information over the channel. However, the throughput
of channel using any encryption algorithm should be taken into account to ensure an efficient
use of the channel resources. In this chapter we maximize the throughput of the channel
which was ignored earlier in the design of M-DES.

4.3

Contributions

In this chapter we propose a new encryption algorithm based on M-DES, that takes into
account the throughput of the channel. This algorithm uses an encryption block and key
sizes such that the throughput is maximized for a specific security level. Therefore, for a
certain required security level the throughput of the channel is maximized, which ensures
that the security constraints are met and the throughput is optimized for that required
security.

4.4

Adaptive M-DES Design and Architecture

In M-DES, a new round called round 17 was added to a modified version of the standard
DES. The new round uses the output of the standard DES (with some modification in the
S-Boxes mapping tables) and a new 80-bit key to generate a ciphertext of 128 bits. However,
the bandwidth efficiency is decreased because the new design requires sending 128 bits to
transmit an actual 64 bits of useful information. The 64-bit useful ciphertext (i.e., output
of round 16) is mapped into a 128-bit ciphertext using a new 80-bit key. The 64-bit output
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of round 16 is divided into 16 sub-frames of 4 bits each, and each of those sub-frames is
mapped to one of the 32 output sub-frames (i.e., 128/4 = 32) using 5 bits of the key. The
remaining 16 sub-frames of the output are randomly filled with ones and zeros. Therefore,
the M-DES is using 50% of the bandwidth to transmit encrypted information.
In this work, we will further introduce two modifications to the M-DES, by making the
length of the ciphertext variable rather than being fixed and equal to 128 bits. While in
the other modification, we will be making use of the wasted space in round 17 by using the
same ciphertext for more than one block of the plaintext. To illustrate the modifications,
we assume an example where the channel conditions are fixed on a certain Signal-to-Noise
ratio (SNR), and the optimal ciphertext size required to maintain a certain security level
is 138 bits. In [8], the 138-bit block size is not available, therefore the 160-bit block size is
used. However, in our case the 138 bits should be rounded to the first number that divides
4 (i.e., because each sub-frame is 4 bits long). Therefore, the ciphertext size that M-DES
is going to use is 140 bits rather than 160 bits in the case of [8]. However, the algorithm
used in [8] encrypts a 160-bit plaintext into a 160-bit ciphertext, but for M-DES, a 64-bit
plaintext is encrypted to a 140-bit ciphertext. Therefore, the algorithm in [8] uses 100% of
the channel bandwidth while M-DES only uses 46 % of the same bandwidth, due to the fact
the 16 sub-frames (i.e., output of round 16) are hidden in the 35 output sub-frames (i.e.,
35 = 140/4), while the remaining 35 − 16 = 19 sub-frames are filled with random zeros
and ones. This is how M-DES would handle the encryption. However, by introducing the
second modification in this work we will make use of the remaining 19 sub-frames to include
the 16 encrypted sub-frames of the next block (i.e., encrypted with the first 16 rounds only,
therefore the output would be 64 bits at this point) and the first 3 sub-frames of the third
block. Therefore, the algorithm is now using 100 % of the bandwidth to encrypt a 140-bit
plaintext into a 140-bit ciphertext. So, although the algorithm in [8] is using the bandwidth
efficiently, it is not using the exact optimal block size that depends on the channel conditions
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and the required security level, while in the new optimized M-DES we use a very close block
size to the optimal block size (i.e., maximum difference from the optimal block size is 3 bits
only, because we need a number that divides four without a remainder).
To handle these modifications, more than one key need to be introduced to round 17
in order to map the sub-frames of the different blocks. Assuming the same example where
a 140-bit cipher is used, the cipher consists of 35 sub-frames, therefore, two blocks and
the first 3 sub-frames of the third block can fit in the 140-bit cipher. In this case three
blocks are mapped to the same cipher, so three keys are required for the mapping. The
first block will have the option to choose 16 different keys from the 35 key pool 000000 to
100010 to map its 16 sub-frames. While the second block will have the option to choose 16
different keys from the remaining 35 − 16 = 19 key pool, and the third block will have the
remaining 35 − 16 − 16 = 3 keys. Theses three keys will be concatenated together along
with the original 56-bit key of DES. Figure 4.1 shows the block diagram for the proposed
modification introduced to M-DES. The figure explains the example above, where the cipher
size is 140-bit. This cipher can fit two blocks and the first three sub-frames of the third
block.
1

2 3

16

22 11 35

17 18 19

32

1 19 3 17

33 34 35

48

27 4 13 29

Figure 4.1. Block diagram of the modifications introduced to M-DES, which makes more flexible and adaptable
to the optimal cipher size. In this example, the cipher size is 140-bit
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4.5

Security Enhancement of the Proposed Algorithm

In this section, we provide the analysis of the security enhancement of the new modifications
in the proposed algorithm, in terms of its strength to brute force and differential cryptanalysis
attacks.

4.5.1

Against Brute Force Attack

By introducing the new keys of round 17 and by concatenating those keys with the original
key of DES, the algorithm is more immune against this attack, which is based on trying all
possible keys to decrypt a ciphertext. Assuming that the 56-bit key of the standard DES
can be obtained in one second using this attack, by a simple calculation the attacker needs
239 years to obtain the key in the worst case scenario where the ciphertext size is 64 bits
(i.e., 64-bit input of round 17 is mapped to a 64-bit output of the round).

4.5.2

Against Differential Cryptanalysis Attack

In M-DES, it was illustrated that 213 pairs of plaintexts and their corresponding useful
ciphertexts (i.e., before entering round 17) are required to break M-DES using this attack,
however, the probability of getting one useful pair (i.e., 64-64 pair) from the 64-128 pair is
given by
1
= 7.9515 × 10−23 ,
p =  
32
× 16!
16

(4.5.1)

where the 32 is the number of sub-frames of the 128-bit cipher, that are used to hide the 16
sub-frames of the 64-bit useful cipher. Therefore, the probabilities of getting one useful pair
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for a cipher of N sub-frames
1
p1 =  
N
× 16! × (N − 16)!
16
1
p2 =  
N
× 16! × 16!(N − 32)!
16
1
p3 =  
N
× 16! × 16! × 16!(N − 48)!
16
1/(16!)n+1
n
pn =   
,
N
N − 16(n + 1)
×
× (N − 16(n + 1))!
16
16

(4.5.2a)

(4.5.2b)

(4.5.2c)

(4.5.2d)

where (4.5.2a) is for 16 ≤ N ≤ 32, (4.5.2b) is for 32 ≤ N ≤ 48, (4.5.2c) is for 48 ≤ N ≤ 64
and (4.5.2d) is for any given N. Two, three, four, n + 1 ciphers can be fitted in (4.5.2a),
(4.5.2b), (4.5.2c) and (4.5.2d), respectively. It can be clearly noticed from the equations that
when the cipher size increases, the probability of breaking the algorithm using differential
cryptanalysis attack will decrease significantly.

4.6

Throughput-Security Trade-offs

In this section, we present the throughput-security problem defined in [8] and we apply it
to our proposed algorithm. The problem objective is to maximize the overall throughput
while maintaining a minimum required security level. It is assumed that the transmitter has a
knowledge of the channel state information (CSI) over a super frame duration, which consists
of n sub-frames, where the throughput per sub-frame is given by Ri (1 − Pi )Ni ≈ Ri (1 − Ni Pi )
for Pi << 1 for a given and fixed Ni . The normalized throughput and security level of the
system can be respectively, defined by
T =

n
1 X
Ri (1 − Ni Pi )
nRmax i=0

n
1 X
S =
log2 Ni ,
nSmax i=0
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(4.6.1)
(4.6.2)

where Ri is the transmission rate, Ni is the encryption block length, Rmax is the maximum
transmission rate among all sub-frames, Smax is the maximum security level which is defined
by Smax = log2 Nmax where Nmax is the maximum ciphertext length, Pi is the channel bit
error probability and n is the number of the sub-frames in the input data stream. We
calculate the optimum encryption block size N for each sub-frame and will be the same
during that sub-frame. As stated earlier, the security of the system increases whenever the
block length increases. The problem here is to maximize the throughput across the whole
data stream (all sub-frames) while maintaining a certain required level of security and to be
within the allowable encryption block sizes which are from 64 bits to 256 bits. Therefore,
the optimization problem can be formulated as
n
1 X
Ri (1 − Ni Pi )
max
Ni nRmax
i=0

subject to

(4.6.3)
1
nSmax

n
X

log2 Ni = Sreq

(4.6.4)

i=0

and

(4.6.5)
64 6 Ni 6 256

(4.6.6)

where Sreq is the required level of security. It should be noted that Pi is a function of the
channel Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR). The optimization problem can be transformed to an
unconstrained problem using Lagrange multipliers method. Using this method, the object
function can be written as
n
1 X
C=
Ri (1 − Ni Pi ) +
nRmax i=0


n
1 X
λ
log2 Ni − Sreq
nSmax i=0

(4.6.7)

where λ is the lagrange multiplier. By taking partial derivatives with respect to Ni and
setting the result to zero, we obtain
1

Ni∗

(Πni=1 Ri Pi ) n (Smax Sreq )loge 2
=
e
Ri Pi
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(4.6.8)

where Ni∗ is the optimized block length.
For each sub-frame, the channel condition are assumed to be well-known, hence the SNR
of the channel and Pi are known as well. Therefore, the optimal ciphertext block size is
calculated based on the solution provided in (4.6.8). Afterwards, the sender divides the
sub-frames into blocks of 64 bits each and encrypt each into its 64-bit cipher (before round
17). Multiple 64-bit cipher are scrambled into the Ni∗ -bit optimal ciphertext block. The
sender then transmits the Ni∗ -bit optimal ciphertext blocks for that specific sub-frame. At
the receiver side, the receiver will have the keys that were used in the scrambling and he will
be able to reconstruct the 64-bit cipher in order to decrypt them into their corresponding
64-bit plaintexts. The steps of the algorithm are stated in algorithm 1.

4.7

Numerical Results and Discussions

In this section, we use Numerical Results to evaluate the performance of the proposed algorithm in a wireless fading channel. We assume that the channel fading gain (α) follows a
Rayleigh distribution with a 1/5 block coding rate and a binary phase shift keying (BPSK)
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modulation. he normalized throughput of the channel is computed based on (4.6.1), where

1
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Normalized Throughput
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Normalized Throughput of Adaptive M-DES
Normalized Throughput of Adaptive Rijndael (3)
Normalized Throughput of 256-bit AES
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Figure 4.2. Normalized throughput of the proposed algorithm as compared to the optimized Rijndael introduced
in [8] and the fixed 256-bit AES for a security level of Sreq = 0.975, in Rayleigh fading channel with a block code
rate of 1/5.

Pi is the bit error probability for the n-coded BPSK with rayleigh fading channel and is
given in [47] by

Pi =

1 − σ̃
2

n X

q
n−1 
n−1+q
1 + σ̃
,
q
2
q=0

(4.7.1)

where σ̃ is given by
σ̃ =

p

γb /(γb + n)

(4.7.2)

and n is the channel block coding rate and is equal to 5. While γb is given by
γb = α2 Eb /N0 ,
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(4.7.3)

where Eb /N0 is the average signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) with a range of 0 to 35 dB. The
average fading power α is assumed to be equal to one. Results of the normalized throughput
versus the average SNR per bit for adaptive M-DES, adaptive Rijndael, and fixed length
256-bit AES are depicted in Figure 4.2.
The figure shows the normalized throughput obtained from the use of our proposed mechanism as compared to the throughput obtained from using the same optimization mechanism
over the variable length Rijndael algorithm proposed in [8] as well as to the throughput of
using the fixed length 256-bit AES encryption. It is clearly noticed from the figure that our
proposed algorithm outperforms the proposed algorithm in [8], in addition, it significantly
outperforms the use of the fixed 256-bit AES algorithm. Moreover, our algorithm is shown
to be more powerful when the signal-to-noise ratio is low (worst channel conditions, i.e.,
lower SNR values). It should be noted that the proposed algorithm requires more computational time; however, given fast microprocessors available today this computational time is
insignificant.

4.8

Conclusions

In this chapter we proposed a new throughput-security optimized encryption algorithm where
we introduced a variable ciphertext size for encryption and we encrypt multiple blocks of
the plaintext into one ciphertext. The ciphertext size was chosen optimally to achieve the
maximum throughput while maintaining a required certain security level. We were able to
chose a ciphertext size that is very close to the optimal size specified by the optimization
problem, unlike other algorithms where the size should be rounded up to the closest size
provided by the algorithm. In addition, we analyzed the security of the proposed algorithm
in terms of its strength to applicable attacks, and we showed how the new mapping of
multiple encrypted blocks into the same ciphertext had strengthened the security of the
algorithm. Moreover, we showed that the proposed algorithm outperforms the use of the
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variable block length Rijndael and the fixed block length 256-bit AES encryption algorithms,
over the same optimization framework, for the same required security level.
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Chapter 5
Key-Based Coded Permutation
Modified-DES (KBCP-M-DES)
5.1

Introduction

In this chapter we propose a new key based coded permutation box at the output of DES
instead of round 17, while keeping the other modifications M-DES introduced to DES. In
the KBCP box we make use of the empty blocks of round 17 to implement channel coding.
Channel coding techniques are common modern techniques that are used for error detection
and correction over wireless channels. Since M-DES uses a 128-bit cipher, out of which 64
bits only hold useful information, the remaining 64 bits can be used to implement channel
coding, which significantly improves the probability of correct reception, and make use of the
wasted bandwidth, however, the complexity of the encryption algorithm may be increased.
We call the proposed algorithm KBCP-M-DES.

5.2

Motivation

Our motivation for the work in this chapter is based on the fact that we are interested in
using the available space in the M-DES cipher to increase the confidentiality and reliability
of the transmitted information, by using the remaining space to implement channel coding
techniques and/or adding other keys to increase the confusion of the encrypted blocks.
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5.3

Contributions

In this chapter, we propose what we call the Key-Based Coded Permutation Modified-DES
where we use hamming codes in the remaining space of M-DES last round. In another design
we add another key to map the coded blocks which increase the confusion of the encrypted
information and hence increases the security of the algorithm. Therefore, in this chapter,
we include new techniques that makes use of the remaining space of M-DES to implement
channel coding in addition to using a new key. By these modifications, we experience more
reliable data transmission and enhanced security. Therefore, in this chapter we propose a
new algorithm that utilizes the throughput of the channel by introducing channel coding
without an additional cost to the size of the cipher, by making use of the empty space in
M-DES. Furthermore, a third key is introduced to map the blocks that hold the codes which
significantly enhances the security of the algorithm.

5.4

Review of the Hamming Codes

We are going to use the hamming (7,4) coding technique with an additional parity bit.
This techniques adds 3 control bits to a 4 data bits with an additional bit for parity [44].
Therefore, this technique is perfect for round 17 structure where the 64-bit input of the round
is divided into 16 sub-frames, of four bits each. Hence, for each one block of information
(4 bits), we will generate one block of control (3+1 bits), rather than just having a random
block entries for each block of data as the case of round 17.
Hamming codes were invented in 1950 by Richard Hamming, and it can detect two errors
at lease in each block and is able to correct at least one bit in hamming (7,4) technique.
Hamming codes are widely used in many applications such as computer memory RAM due to
their simplicity and effectiveness in detecting and correcting errors. Being able to detect two
bit errors and correct one bit error in each 4-bit block is very effective and sufficient enough
to be used in our analysis and simulations. For example, in the worst channel conditions of
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our assumptions where SNR can be as low as -5 db, the probability of error would be around
0.3 theoretically, which implies that 1-2 bits will be in error out of each 4-bit block under
these conditions. However, in better channel conditions the probability of encountering a
single error within 4 bits decreases significantly, which makes the use of hamming (7,4) the
simplest, fastest and most efficient to be used in our application.
Hamming (7,4) code is based on adding three parity bits p1 , p2 , p3 to 4 bits of data
d1 , d2 , d3 , d4 . Each parity bit depends on three data bits out of the four, such that if the
number of locations that holds a value of one out of those three locations is an odd number,
the parity bit will be one. So p1 is set to 1 if the bits d1 , d2 and d4 have an odd number of
ones, while it set to zero if the number of ones is even. In a similar way p2 depends on data
bits d1 , d3 and d4 and p3 depends on data bits d2 , d3 and d4 . The following table summarizes
theses dependencies. To increase the security of the code the three bits of parity are not

Table 5.1. Parity bits dependencies

p1
p2
p3

d1
Yes
Yes
No

d2
Yes
No
Yes

d3
No
Yes
Yes

d4
Yes
Yes
Yes

simply added to the four data bits, instead it is placed in between the data bits according
to the following table.

Table 5.2. Hamming (7,4) code word structure

p1

p2

d1

p3

d2

d3

d4

Because hamming codes are linear codes, linear algebra can be used to compute the
hamming (7,4) code. The hamming matrix can be defined by two matrices, G the generator
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matrix and H the parity check matrix. Where G and


1 1 0 1


1 0 1 1




1 0 0 0




G = 0 1 1 1


0 1 0 0




0 0 1 0


0 0 0 1

1 0 1 0 1

H = 
0 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 1

H are given by


0 1

1 1

1 1

(5.4.1)

Assuming that the data bits are ordered in a vector p = (1, 0, 1, 1) , to construct a codeword
x
   

0
2
1 1 0 1
   


1 0 1 1   3 1
   


   

 1
1 0 0 0   1 1

 0    

     
x = Gp = 0 1 1 1   = 2 = 0

     
0 1 0 0 1 0 0
   


   

 1
1 1
0 0 1 0
   


1
1
0 0 0 1


(5.4.2)

where the results are taken in modulo 2 format to produce zeros and ones. To check if an
error has occurred in the received coded word, the received word is multiplied by the matrix
H
 
0
 
1



     

1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1
2
0

 
   

 0 = 4 = 0 .
z = Hr = 
0 1 1 0 0 1 1 
     

0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
2
0
0
 
1
 
1
87

5.5

KBCP-M-DES Design and Architecture

In this section we show the design and architecture of the key based coded permutation box
(KBCP), where we implement two different designs based on the level of security required
and based on the available resources.

5.5.1

KBCP-M-DES with One Key

Motivated by the idea of round 17 of M-DES in 2, we introduce the KBCP by introducing
channel coding in the unutilized blocks of round 17. Transferring from round 17 to KBCP,
the empty blocks of round 17 are used to hold useful coded information rather than being
filed randomly as in the case of M-DES. In M-DES, the output of round 16 consists of 64
bits of encrypted information which are divided into 16 blocks of four bits each. Using a
key of 80 bits, each five bits of the key are used to map each 4-bit block of the encrypted
information to a new block of the 32 output blocks.
In KBCP, these 16 blocks (B1 , B2 ....B16 ) go through an extra operation before being
mapped to the 32 block output. Each block of the input is coded using hamming (7,4)
coding technique into a 7-bit codeword with an additional parity bit making the total size
of the codeword of 8 bits. Therefore, 16 codewords (C1 , C2 ....C16 ) each of 8 bits will be
generated at this stage with a total size of 128 bits.
Each of the sixteen 8-bit codeword is then divided into two smaller blocks a and b, with
4 bits in each block (Cia , Cib ), where i = 1 to 16. Each five bits of the 80-bit key are used
to map the a blocks of the codewords C1a , C2a ....C16a into their new location in the 128-bit
output that consist of 32 blocks of 4 bits each. At the end of this step, 16 blocks of the
output are full with the a blocks of the codewords, while 16 blocks are still empty. These
empty blocks will hold the b blocks of the codewords C1b , C2b ....C16b one by one without
being mapped by a key. Meaning that C1b will be located in the first empty block, C2b
will be located in the second empty block and so on. At the receiver side, the 80-bit key is
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KBCP Input (Round 16 Output)
64-bit

0

1

2

8

Key 1 (80-bit)

15

01111- 01100 – 00000 -……- 00001

C0a

0

1

2

C0b

3

4

C15a

C15b

16

31

KBCP Output
128-bit

Figure 5.1. The block diagram for the KBCP with one key, where each 5 bits of the key is responsible of mapping
the Cia blocks to their new locations. While the Cib blocks are mapped to the empty blocks according to their
order. The input to the KBCP box is coming from round 16 output of DES after the modifications we introduced
(i.e, The first four S-Boxes uses a similar mapping tables which are the same as the first mapping table of the
standard DES, while the fifth through the eighth S-Boxes use similar mapping tables that are the same as the
fourth S-Box mapping table in the standard DES)

used to locate C1a , C2a ....C16a , the remaining blocks that were not mapped by the key are
C1b , C2b ....C16b based on the order they are located with. Figure 5.1 shows the block diagram
for KBCP with one key.

5.5.2

KBCP-M-DES with Two Keys

In this section another 80-bit key is introduced to map the b blocks of the codewords to
the empty 16 locations of the output rather than just allocating those blocks according to
their order within the empty blocks. However, the selection of the second key can’t be
random within the locations, it should be chosen such that it takes the empty 16 blocks
only. This will add one more restriction on selecting the second key, while the first key only
had one restriction that each 5-bit block of the key should be unique. Therefore, rather than
locating the b blocks of the coded words in one single way (i.e, according to their order as
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KBCP Input (Round 16 Output)
64-bit

0

1

2

8

15

Key 1 (80-bit):
01111- 01100 – 00000 -……- 00001
Key 2 (80-bit):
11011- 11100 – 00010 -……- 11000
C0a

0

1

2

C0b

3

C15a

4

16

C15b

25

27

31

KBCP Output
128-bit

Figure 5.2. Block diagram for the KBCP with two keys, where each 5 bits of the first key is responsible of
mapping the Cia blocks to their new locations. While each 5 bits of the second key is responsible of mapping the
Cib blocks to the remaining locations. The input to the KBCP box is coming from round 16 output of DES after
the modifications we introduced (i.e, The first four S-Boxes uses a similar mapping tables which are the same
as the first mapping table of the standard DES, while the fifth through the eighth S-Boxes use similar mapping
tables that are the same as the fourth S-Box mapping table in the standard DES)

shown in the previous sub section), there would be 16! ways to place those blocks within
the 16 empty blocks of the output. Although the addition of this new key will not affect
the error performance due to the fact that nothing is changed in the coding mechanism, it
will significantly improves the security of the algorithm by making it harder for the attacker
to figure out the location of the other half of each coded word as we will show later in
this chapter. On the other hand the complexity of the two key version of KBCP will add
to the complexity of the algorithm in terms of the number of asthmatic operations and
memory accesses as we will show in next chapters. Figure 5.2 shows the block diagram for
KBCP-M-DES with two keys.
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5.6

Error Performance of KBCP-M-DES

In this section we show the performance of the proposed algorithm on the bit error rate
(BER) performance. By introducing channel coding in KBCP, the error at the receiver is
expected to be improved and hence the error after decryption is expected to be improved
as well. The hamming code is able to discover and correct errors. The error performance
of KBCP-M-DES is the same in both cases of one key and two keys, because the addition
of the second key does not enhance the coding mechanism, it only increases the security
of the cipher. Using computer simulations, the performance of the proposed algorithm on
the error performance is evaluated as shown in Figure 5.3. We assume that the channel is
an additive white gaussian noise (AWGN) channel with binary phase shift keying (BPSK)
modulation. We encrypt a large amount of information using AES, DES, M-DES, AES
with hamming (7,4) channel coding, DES with hamming (7,4) soft decision channel coding
and the proposed KBCP-M-DES, then the encrypted information are transmitted over the
channel and decrypted at the receiver side. The error is computed by comparing the data
after decryption at the receiver side with the data before encryption at the transmitter side.

We compare the effect of the KBCP-M-DES versus AES, DES and versus the original
M-DES. It can be noticed from the figure that the use of the proposed algorithm outperforms
the use of AES and DES with hamming (7,4) channel coding as well as M-DES. Figure 5.4
shows the effect of using block code rate of 1/2 rather than the hamming(7,4) code. It can
be noticed that the hamming codes degrades the error performance for low values of SNR,
while the 1/2 block code enhances the performance for all SNR ranges.

5.7

Security of KBCP-M-DES

The security of the proposed encryption algorithm is measured by the attackers ability to
crack it. There are five general types of attacks that may be applied to any encryption
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AES
AES + hamming(7,4)
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DES + hamming(7,4)
M-DES
M-DES + KBCP
No Encryption
No Encryption + KBCP
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Figure 5.3. BER vs. SNR in AWGN channel with BPSK modulation, comparison of using AES, DES, M-DES
(no channel coding), AES with hamming (7,4) channel coding, DES with hamming (7,4) channel coding and the
proposed encryption algorithm KBCP-M-DES

algorithm: ciphertext only, known plaintext, chosen plaintext, chosen ciphertext and chosen
text attacks. However, in symmetric block cipher algorithms the first and second types are
the most applicable attacks [19]. The most known example of the first type is the brute
force attack which is only successful on short keys. While the differential cryptanalysis is an
example of the second type of attacks, which we are going to study the possibility of such
an attack on the proposed algorithm.
In this section we study the effect of the differential cryptanalysis attack on KBCP.
Starting by the case where only one key is used in KBCP, the security of the algorithm is
not upgraded or downgraded compared to the security of M-DES. This is due to the fact
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Figure 5.4. BER vs. SNR in AWGN channel with BPSK modulation, comparison of using AES, DES, M-DES
(no channel coding), AES with hamming (7,4) channel coding, DES with hamming (7,4) channel coding and the
proposed encryption algorithm KBCP-M-DES

that the key is used to place the a blocks, while the b blocks were placed in order. Given that
the attacker by any way was able to access the 80-bit key, he will be able to use the key to
figure out the locations of the a blocks, and the b blocks will be placed in their order. Hence,
the main advantage of the first design of KBCP (i.e. one key only) is to improve the error
performance with the least addition to the complexity. So, the availability of the 80-bit key
is enough to figure out the location of the a and b blocks, and hence to reconstruct the code
words and by decoding the codewords the actual data can be retrieved. The probability of
a successful attack on KBCP with one key only is similar to that of M-DES.
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the output of the first 16 rounds of M-DES is entered
into the KBCP phase, where the 64-bit cipher of M-DES is converted to a 128-bit cipher.
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In order to apply the differential cryptanalysis attack, the actual 64-bit cipher should be
extracted by the attacker from the 128-bit cipher, for a large number of cipher, which helps
the attacker to obtain the key. In KBCP with one key, the probability of extracting one
64-bit cipher out of its 128-bit cipher is equivalent to that of M-DES and is given by
1
p1 =  
= 7.9515 × 10−23 .
32
× 16!
16

(5.7.1)

Similar to M-DES, KBCP requires 214 pairs of plaintext and their associated 64-bit ciphertext
to have a successful attack on the algorithm [7], the probability of attacking KBCP with one
key using differential cryptanalysis is given by
 
NP NP
Pattack =
p (1 − p1 )NP −NP
NP 1
P
= pN
1

= (7.9515 × 10−23 )NP
= (7.9515 × 10−23 )2

14

= 9.0841 × 10−362080
= 0.

(5.7.2)

On the other hand, the addition of the second key has added another security factor to
the algorithm. Assuming that the attacker has access to the 128-bit ciphertext and to the
80-bit first key, it is not directly easy to find the 64-bit cipher of DES, due to the fact that
the other halves of the codewords are not placed in order and there is 16! ways to arrange
them through the cipher. In the case of KBCP with two keys, assuming that the attacker
has access to 214 pairs of plaintexts and their corresponding ciphertexts (64-bit to 128-bit),
the probability of obtaining one useful pair will decrease by 16! compared to the case of
KBCP with one key and M-DES. The probability of extracting one useful pair is given by
1
= 3.8 × 10−36 .
p1 =  
32
× 16! × 16!
16
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(5.7.3)

Therefore, the probability of guessing all the useful ciphers is given by
Pattack = (3.8 × 10−36 )2

14

= 1.4916 × 10−580325
= 0.

(5.7.4)

Hence, the probability of attack in KBCP two key mode significantly decreases compared to
that of the one key mode and M-DES.
Another way to look at the possibility of attacking the algorithm using the differential
cryptanalysis is to calculate the required time to do so. The number of trials an attacker
needs to perform in order to achieve a successful attack on the one key mode of KBCP is
given by
Ntrials

 
214
32
=
× 16!
16
= 7.9 × 10362078 trials.

(5.7.5)

However, the fastest super computer today can perform 2.5 × 1012 operations per second.
Therefore, the total time needed to attack KBCP one key mode using differential cryptanalysis is given by
Tattack =

7.9 × 10362078
2.5 × 1012

= 3.16 × 10362066 seconds
= 1.002 × 10362059 years

(5.7.6)

to perform a successful attack on the one key mode of KBCP. On the other hand, for the
two key mode KBCP, the number of trails that the attacker needs to perform increases
significantly and is given by
Ntrials

 
214
32
× 16! × 16!
=
16
= 1.18 × 10580324 trials.
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(5.7.7)

Therefore, the total time needed to attack KBCP two key mode using differential cryptanalysis is given by
Tattack =

1.18 × 10580324
2.5 × 1012

= 4.7 × 10580311 seconds
= 1.5 × 10580304 years

(5.7.8)

to perform a successful attack on the two key mode of KBCP. Hence, the two key mode of
KBCP requires 10218248 years more than the one key KBCP to attack the algorithm.

5.8

Conclusions

In this chapter we proposed a new encryption mechanism called KBCP-M-DES in which
we introduce a key-based permutation and channel coding on top of the first 16 rounds of
DES, as well as by keeping the modifications to the S-Boxes design in the first 16 rounds
introduced earlier in M-DES. In one design we only added channel coding to the cipher which
improved the error performance, and in another design we added another key in addition to
the channel coding to further enhance the security of the encrypted information. We used
computer simulations to show that the proposed algorithm improves the error performance
at the receiver compared to the use of AES and DES with the same channel coding as well
as to M-DES in a wireless application. We have also shown using numerical results that it is
impossible to attack the proposed algorithm using the differential cryptanalysis unlike DES
which was cracked by the differential cryptanalysis attack. As a result, we introduced a new
encryption mechanism, that outperforms AES and DES in terms of the error performance
in wireless channels as well as being secure against attacks.
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Chapter 6
Complexity Analysis of Symmetric
Encryption Algorithms
6.1

Introduction

Most of the encryption algorithms mentioned in earlier chapters are being used for years,
therefore, a comprehensive complexity analysis is required to compare the performance of
the algorithms independently from the platform implementations. The complexity analysis of this class of encryption algorithms (Symmetric Encryption Algorithms) had attracted
many researchers, who developed and used different methodologies to analyze and compute
the complexity [9]-[11]. However, those methodologies lacked the comprehensiveness in their
analysis, due to the ignorance of the memory access time, which greatly affects the performance as we will show later in this chapter when we take it into consideration in our analysis.
Moreover, we use computer simulations on two different platforms, to compute the effective
encryption rate for symmetric encryption algorithms.

6.2

Motivation

A secure encryption algorithm could be very complicated, time consuming and hard to
implement. Therefore, the complexity of an algorithm which we measure by the time required
for encryption and/or decryption should be taken into account when the algorithm is designed
and implemented. In this chapter we compute the complexity for a class of symmetric
97

encryption algorithms in terms of the number of clock cycles required for encryption and
decryption and hence in terms of the required time for encryption and decryption.

6.3

Contributions

In this chapter we provide a complete comprehensive complexity analysis for a class of
symmetric-encryption algorithm. This is the first complexity analysis of symmetric-encryption
algorithm that considers the required time to retrieve information such as the S-Box entries
from memory. Therefore, the analysis is more comprehensive and more accurate than previous work. In addition, we use computer simulations on two different machines with two
different microprocessors to encrypt various files with various sizes. Finally, we compare the
analytical and simulation results to truly evaluate the accuracy of our analysis.

6.4

Analytical Complexity Analysis

In this section we present the methodology that we use to compare the complexity of various
symmetric encryption algorithms. The analysis is based on counting the number of the
byte-wise arithmetic operations required to perform encryption and decryption using each
algorithm. This analysis is based on calculating the number of operations required to encrypt
and decrypt one block of data. The operations of DES, 3-DEA, AES M-DES and KBCPM-DES are limited to the logical XOR and shift operations. In addition to the memory
access time that is required to access and retrieve some information necessary to perform
encryption and decryption.
The number of byte-wise arithmetic operations and the number of byte-wise memory
access can be simply transformed to the number of clock cycles required to perform each
operation. The number of clock cycles is general for any platform, because the clock cycle
is the smallest time entity on any platform. Therefore, the total time of encryption or
decryption can be simply measured by multiplying the number of clock cycles by the time
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of each clock cycle which varies based on the used platform. In the next subsections we
will apply this methodology on DES, 3-DEA, AES, M-DES and KBCP-M-DES encryption
algorithms.

6.4.1

Analytical Complexity Analysis of DES

The complexity of DES can be expressed in terms of the number of required operation
to perform encryption [10], and hence it can be translated to the number of clock cycles
required for encryption. Both expressions make the analysis more generalized and valid for
any platform with any processor(s) speed.
Number of Operations
The data encryption standard consist of an initial and final permutation stages which can
be broke down to simple byte-wise shift operations. While the 16 rounds can be broke down
to byte-wise XOR and shift operations.
The initial permutation and final permutations are based on changing bits locations only.
Since the input to both phases is a 64-bit input, each of the initial and final permutation
consists of exactly 8 byte-wise shift operations.
Now let us count the number of byte-wise operations for each of the rounds, the 64-bit
input of each round is first divided into two 32-bit blocks. The operations inside the round
are as follows.
• The left 32-bit block is XOR-ed with the 32-bit output of the F-Box. The output of
the XOR operation is considered as the 32 right bits output of the round. Therefore,
32/8 = 4 byte-wise XOR operations are required at this step.
• The right 32-bit block enters along with the round key as inputs to the F-Box. The
32-bit input is mapped to 48 bits using the P-Box. The P-Box is a direct permutation
operation. So, 48/8 = 6 byte-wise shift operations are required at this stage. The
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48-bit of the P-Box is XORed with 48-bit round key. 6 byte-wise XOR operations are
needed at this stage. The last and most complicated phase of the F-Box is the S-Box
phase, where each 6-bits are mapped to a different 4-bit output using a pre-stored SBox. Each 6 bits of the 48-bit input uses a different 4 × 16 bytes table. Eight different
bytes need to be accessed and retrieved from the memory, one for each S-Box . So, 8
byte-wise memory accesses are required for this stage.
• The 1-1 permutation needs 4 byte-wise shift operations.
• Hence 10 byte-wise shift operations, 6 byte-wise XOR operations and 8 byte-wise memory access are required for the F-Box stage.
The total number of operations required for each round is
• 6 + 4 = 10 byte-wise shift operations.
• 6 + 4 = 10 byte-wise XOR operations.
• 8 byte-wise memory accesses.
Number of clock cycles
Assuming that Intel x86 instruction set is used. The number of clock cycles required to
perform a shift or an XOR operation is 1 clock cycle only. While the number of clock cycles
needed for the memory access is given in table 6.1 [43].
The total number of clock cycles needed to encrypt or decrypt one block of data is given
by the following equation
Ncc = (8 + 8) × Tshif t
+ R(10 × Tshif t + 10 × Txor + 8 × Tma )

(6.4.1)

where Txor , Tshif t , Tma are the number of cycles needed to perform one XOR operation,
one shift operation and one memory access operation respectively. And R is the number of
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Table 6.1. Number of clock cycles required to access various memory types

Memory Type
Registers
L1 Cache
L2 Cache
L3 Cache
Main Memory

Clock Cycles
1
4
10
40-75
60-100

rounds which is 16 in DES.
Based on the Intel x86 instruction set, Txor = 3 clock cycles, Tshif t = 1 clock cycle and
Tma = 80 because the tables are originally stored in the main memory. Therefore, the total
number of clock cycles cycles needed to encrypt the first block of data using DES is given
by,
Ncc = (8 + 8) × 1 + 16(10 × 1 + 10 × 3
+ 8 × 80) = 10896 clock cycles.

(6.4.2)

To find the total number of clock cycles required to encrypt any number of blocks, the
number of blocks N is multiplied by the average number of clock cycles required to encrypt
any block. The number of clock cycles required to encrypt the n − th block is supposed to
be less than or equal to the (n − 1)th block. This is due to the fact that the time required to
access the memory to retrieve the S-Box entries will vary from block to another. Moreover,
the total memory access time of the current block is less than that required for the previous
block, because some entries may already been retrieved earlier and hence stored at L1 or L2
cache, which saves a significant amount of time, especially when the number of encrypted
blocks increase,
Ncc1 ≥ Ncc1 ≥ . . . ≥ Ncc(n−1) ≥ Nccn .

(6.4.3)

To be able to estimate the number of required clock cycles analytically, we find the upper
and lower bounds for this number, by assuming that all memory accesses are main memory
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access for all blocks (upper bound), and by assuming that all memory accesses are L2 cache
memory accesses (lower bound). Moreover, the time required for encryption is given by the
total number of clock cycles multiplied by the time of each clock cycles (clock duration),
which varies based on the implemented platform. The upper and lower bounds for the total
number of clock cycles are given by
Nupper = N × 10896

(6.4.4)

Nlower = (N − 1) × 1168 + 10896.

(6.4.5)

Therefore, the average number of clock cycles needed to encrypt a stream of bits using DES
is given by
Navg =

Nupper + Nlower
.
2

(6.4.6)

Hence, the required time to encrypt a stream of bits can be calculated analytically by
Tavg = Navg ×

1
f

(6.4.7)

where f is the frequency of the processor used in encryption. For example if we take the
case of encrypting 50 KB of information, the variable N in equation 6.4.4 is given by
N =

50 × 1024 × 8
= 6400.
64

(6.4.8)

Therefore, the maximum and minimum number of clock cycles required to encrypt the 6400
frames are given by
Nupper = 6400 × 10896 = 69734400
Nlower = 6399 × 1168 + 10896 = 7484928
Navg =

Nupper + Nlower
= 38609664.
2

(6.4.9)

Hence, if a machine with f = 2.66GHZ is used to encrypt the 50 KB file, the average
time (in milliseconds) required for encryption is given by
Tavg = 38609664 ×

1
= 14.515.
2.66 × 106
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(6.4.10)

On the other hand, if a machine with Dual processors each having a frequency f = 2.6GHZ is
used to encrypt the 50 KB file, the maximum and minimum amount of times (in milliseconds)
required for encryption is given by
Tavg = 38609664 ×

1
= 7.42.
2 × 2.6 × 106

(6.4.11)

So, the average time needed on machine 1 to encrypt a 50 KB is equal to 14.515 milliseconds,
while the average time required to encrypt the same file size on machine 2 is equal to
7.42 milliseconds. Table 6.2 shows the average times required to encrypt various file sizes
calculated analytically in the same procedure presented above.

Table 6.2. Encryption time required to encrypt different file sizes on two different machines, calculated analytically
when DES is used for encryption

Input File Size
(Kbytes)
50
75
100
200
350
500
800
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
Encryption Rate
(Mbytes/sec)

6.4.2

Machine 1
Machine 2
(Analytical) (Analytical)
14.5
7.4
21.8
11.1
29
14.8
58.1
29.7
101.6
52
145.1
74.2
232.2
118.8
1451.3
742.4
2902.6
1484.8
4353.9
2227.2
5805.2
2969.6
3.46

6.71

Analytical Complexity Analysis of 3-DES

The complexity of 3-DES in terms of encryption would be simply triple that of DES, because
the algorithm is based on repeating DES three times with different keys. However, the
number of clock cycles maybe slightly less than that of DES due to the fact that some
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entries in the S-Boxes maybe already accessed and retrieved, hence it will be saved in the
L1 or L2 cache which requires less time for accessing compared to that of the main memory.
To find the total number of clock cycles required on 3-DES, we first assume that all the
S-Box entries required in the second and third stages of 3-DES were already retrieved in the
first stage, then each memory access requires between 4 and 10 memory cycles rather than
80 clock cycles (depending on whether the retrieved entries are stored in L1 or L2 cache).
Hence Tma in equation 6.4.1 is substituted by 7 (average of 4 and 10) rather than 80 in DES.
Moreover, in this case the Number of clock cycles is given by
Ncc = 10896 + 2 × [(8 + 8) × 1 + 16(10 × 1 + 10 × 3
+ 8 × 7)] = 14000 clock cycles.

(6.4.12)

On the other hand, if we assume that non of the S-Box entries in the second and third stages
were already retrieved in the first stage, the number of clock cycles is given by
Ncc = 3 × 10896 = 32688 clock cycles.

(6.4.13)

Based on this, the number of clock cycles required to encrypt the first block using 3-DES
would be greater than or equal to 14000 clock cycles and less than or equal to 32688 clock
cycles. To generalize the analysis for any number of blocks, we find upper and lower bounds
for the total number of clock cycles, which is given by
Nupper = N × 32688
Nlower = (N − 1) × 14000 + 32688.

(6.4.14)

Using the same procedure presented at the end of the previous sub-section, table 6.3 shows
the average times analytically required to encrypt various file sizes using 3-DES.

6.4.3

Analytical Complexity Analysis of AES

To implement the initial stage of the AES, 16 byte-wise XOR operations are required. Each
of the AES rounds includes the S-Box phase, shift row phase, mix columns phase and the
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Table 6.3. Encryption time needed to encrypt different file sizes on two different machines, calculated analytically
when 3DES is used for encryption

Input File Size
(Kbytes)
50
75
100
200
350
500
800
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
Encryption Rate
(Mbytes/sec)

Machine 1
Machine 2
(Analytical) (Analytical)
56
29
84
43
112
57
225
115
393
201
562
287
899
460
5617
2873
11233
5746
16850
8619
22466
11492
0.89

1.73

add key phase. Based on the same analysis done earlier in DES; to implement one round of
AES, 184 byte-wise AND operations, 136 byte-wise OR operations and 352 byte-wise shift
operations are required. Similarly, the final rounds requires 16 byte-wise XOR operations,
12 byte-wise OR operations and 12 byte-wise shift operations. In addition each round will
require 16 byte-wise memory access operations for the S-Box stage. Therefore the total
number of clock cycles required to encrypt one block of data using AES is given by,
Ncc = 16 × Txor
+ (R − 1)(181 × TAN D + 136 × Tor + 352 × Tshif t
+ 16 × Tma )
+ (16 × Txor + 12 × Tshif t + 12 × Tor )

(6.4.15)

where Txor , Tshif t , Tma , TAN D and TOR are the number of cycles required to perform one XOR
operation, one shift operation, one memory access operation, one AND operation and one
OR operation, respectively; R is the number of rounds. R might be 10, 12 or 14 depending
on the key size selected for encryption.
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As mentioned earlier, based on the Intel x86 instruction set, Txor = 3 clock cycles,
Tshif t = 1 clock cycle and Tma = 80 and TAN D = 1 clock cycle and TOR = 1 clock cycle.
Hence the number of clock cycles needed to encrypt a block of data using AES is given by
Ncc = 16 × 3
+ (R − 1)(181 × 1 + 136 × 1 + 352 × 1
+ 16 × 80) + (16 × 3 + 12 × 1 + 12 × 1).

(6.4.16)

Therefore, Ncc = 17688 clock cycles when R = 10, Ncc = 21592 clock cycles when R = 12
and Ncc = 25496 clock cycles when R = 14. Hence, AES requires 60%, 98% and 114%
more clock cycles than DES, when the key length is 128, 192 and 256 bits respectively. As
done earlier, to generalize the total required number of clock cycles, we find upper and lower
bounds for all the 128-bit, 192-bit and 256-bit AES cases, which are given respectively by
Nupper = N × 17688
Nupper = N × 21592
Nupper = N × 25496

(6.4.17)

Nlower = (N − 1) × 6717 + 17688
Nlower = (N − 1) × 8183 + 21592
Nlower = (N − 1) × 9649 + 25496.

(6.4.18)

Using the same procedure presented at the end of the previous sub-sections, table 6.4 shows
the average times analytically required to encrypt various file sizes using AES.

6.4.4

Analytical Complexity Analysis of M-DES

M-DES was introduced as an efficient, reliable and secure encryption algorithm that can be
used in wireless communication channels. M-DES is based on DES, however the key and the
ciphertext sizes are increased [7]. In M-DES, the first 16 round structure is exactly the same
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Table 6.4. Encryption time needed to encrypt different file sizes on two different machines, calculated analytically
when AES is used for encryption

Input File Size
(Kbytes)
50
75
100
200
350
500
800
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
Encryption Rate
(Mbytes/sec)

Machine 1
Machine 2
(Analytical) (Analytical)
29
15
44
22.5
59
30
117
60.1
206
105.1
294
150.2
470
240.3
2936
1501.8
5872
3003.7
8808
4505.5
11744
6007.4
1.7

3.31

as DES, except that there are two distinct mapping tables rather than eight. However, this
will not reduce the number of required byte-wise memory access, because 8 bytes still need
to be extracted from the memory. Although in DES the 8 bytes need to be retrieved from
8 distinct mapping tables and in M-DES the 8 bytes need to be extracted from 2 distinct
mapping tables, this will not decrease the number of memory access when encrypting the
first data block, because initially all tables are stored in the main memory.
Therefore, the first 16 rounds of M-DES requires the same number of clock cycles that
are required for DES. The addition of round 17, requires 10 more byte-wise memory access
and 8 byte-wise shift operations. Hence, 10 × 8 + 8 × 1 = 880 more clock cycles are needed for
round 17. As a result M-DES requires 10896 + 880 = 11776 clock cycles to encrypt one block
of data. So M-DES requires 9% more clock cycles than DES. The upper and lower bounds
for the total number of clock cycles for N blocks is calculated similarly to the previous cases
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and are given by
Nupper = N × 11776
Nlower = (N − 1) × 2048 + 11776.

(6.4.19)

Using the same procedure presented at the end of the previous sub-sections, table 6.5 shows
the average times analytically required to encrypt various file sizes using M-DES.

Table 6.5. Encryption time needed to encrypt different file sizes on two different machines, calculated analytically
when M-DES is used for encryption

Input File Size
(Kbytes)
50
75
100
200
350
500
800
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
Encryption Rate
(Mbytes/sec)

6.4.5

Machine 1
Machine 2
(Analytical) (Analytical)
16.6
8.5
24.9
12.8
33.3
17
66.5
34
116.4
59.6
166.3
85.1
266.1
136.1
1663
850.7
3326.1
1701.4
4989.1
2552.1
6652.2
3402.8
3.0

5.85

Analytical Complexity Analysis of KBCP-M-DES

In this subsection we evaluate the complexity increase of KBCP-M-DES compared to that
of DES. First lets analyze the complexity of the coding procedure, where 8 bytes of data
are being coded to 16 bytes. The coding adds 8 byte-wise multiplication operations and
16 byte-wise modulo 2 operations (which are basically division operations). Assuming that
the operations are done on the same processor architecture introduced earlier, it will take
12 clock cycles on average to perform one byte-wise multiplication and 14 clock cycles on
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average to perform one byte-wise division. Therefore, the coding adds an overhead to the
total number of clock cycles given by
Nco = (12 × 8) + (14 × 16) = 320.

(6.4.20)

Based on the same methodology used earlier in the chapter, the maximum and minimum
number of clock cycles required to encrypt N blocks of information using KBCP-M-DES in
its one key version is given by
Nupper = N × 12088
Nlower = (N − 1) × 1596 + 12088.

(6.4.21)

Table 6.6 summarizes the average times analytically required to encrypt various file sizes
using KBCP-M-DES in its one key version.

Table 6.6. Encryption time needed to encrypt different file sizes on two different machines, calculated analytically
when KBCP-M-DES in its one key version is used for encryption

Input File Size
(Kbytes)
50
75
100
200
350
500
800
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
Encryption Rate
(Mbytes/sec)

Machine 1
Machine 2
(Analytical) (Analytical)
17.3
8.9
26.1
13.5
34.8
17.8
69
35.5
121
62
173.7
90
278
142
1739
890
3479
1780
5220
2670
6960
3550
2.87

5.6

On the other hand the permutation process using the one key mode of the proposed
algorithm requires 10 more byte-wise memory access and 8 byte-wise shift operations. Hence,
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10 × 8 + 8 × 1 = 880 more clock cycles are required. As a result, the proposed algorithm
in its one key version requires 10896 + 880 + 320 = 12088 clock cycles to encrypt one block
of data. So the one key version of the KBCP-M-DES requires 11% more clock cycles than
DES. On the other hand, by introducing the second key to map the b blocks, the number
of clock cycles is further increased 880 clock cycles as we had shown earlier due to the
permutation overhead associated with the second key. Therefore, the KBCP in its two keys
version requires 10896 + 880 + 880 + 320 = 12976 clock cycles to encrypt one block of data,
which is a 19% increase compared to DES. Based on the same methodology used earlier
in the chapter, the maximum and minimum number of clock cycles required to encrypt N
blocks of information using KBCP-M-DES in its two key version is given by
Nupper = N × 12968
Nlower = (N − 1) × 1704 + 12968.

(6.4.22)

Table 6.7 summarizes the average times analytically required to encrypt various file sizes
using KBCP-M-DES in its two key version. To summarize this section, tables 6.8 and 6.9
summarizes the average amount of time required analytically to encrypt different file sizes
on Intel Pentium(R) 4 CPU 2.66 GHZ and on Intel(R) 2.60 GHZ, using the encryption
algorithms under study.

It can be noticed from both tables that DES has the highest

encryption rate which means that it uses the least amount of time to encrypt the same
amount of data compared to the other encryption algorithms under study, followed by MDES, KBCP-M-DES in its one key version and KBCP-M-DES in its two key version then
AES and finally 3-DES which has the lowest encryption rate and hence the highest amount
of time for encryption.

6.5

Simulations Results

The simulation is based on encrypting various files of various sizes using each algorithm,
then the time that each algorithm takes for encryption will be measured. The simulation is
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Table 6.7. Encryption time needed to encrypt different file sizes on two different machines, calculated analytically
when KBCP-M-DES in its two key version is used for encryption

Input File Size
(Kbytes)
50
75
100
200
350
500
800
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
Encryption Rate
(Mbytes/sec)

Machine 1
Machine 2
(Analytical) (Analytical)
17.7
9.0
26.5
13.7
35.3
18.1
70.6
36.1
123.6
63.2
176.5
90.3
282.4
144.5
1765
903
3530
1806
5295
2708
7060
3612
2.83

5.53

performed on two machines that have different processors with different capabilities. The
first machine processer is an Intel Pinetum 4 with a clock cycle of 2.66 GHZ and the other
one has a processor of Intel Core i5-2540M with a clock cycle of 2.6 GHZ.
Figure 6.1 and 6.2 shows the time needed for encryption versus the file size, using the four
encryption algorithms on both stations. The figures also compares between the analytical
and simulation results. It can be noticed from both figures that the simulation time is slightly
less than the analytical time due to the fact that when the file size increases the probability
of having more data stored in the registers and level 1 cache increases, which reduces the
time required to encrypt later frames.
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Table 6.8. The time (in milliseconds) required to encrypt different file sizes (in Kbytes) on Intel Pinetum(R) 4
CPU 2.66 GHZ

Input File Size
(Kbytes)
50
75
100
200
350
500
800
5000
10000
15000
20000
Encryption Rate
(Mbytes/sec)

DES

M-DES KBCP-M-DES 1

KBCP-M-DES 2

AES

3-DES

14.5
21.8
29
58.1
101.6
145.1
232.2
1451.3
2902.6
4353.9
5805.2

16.6
24.9
33.3
66.5
116.4
166.3
266.1
1663
3326.1
4989.1
6652.2

17.3
26.1
34.8
69
121
173.7
278
1739
3479
5220
6960

17.7
26.5
35.5
70.6
123.6
176.5
282.4
1765
3500
5295
7060

29
44
59
117
206
294
470
2936
5872
8808
11744

56
84
112
225
393
562
899
5617
11233
16850
22466

3.46

3.0

2.87

2.83

1.7

0.89
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AES Simulation
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M-DES Simulation
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Figure 6.1. The time required to encrypt different file sizes using AES, DES and M-DES on machine 1

Table 6.9. The time (in milliseconds) needed to encrypt different file sizes (in Kbytes) on Intel(R) 2.60 GHZ

Input File Size
(Kbytes)
50
75
100
200
350
500
800
5000
10000
15000
20000
Encryption Rate
(Mbytes/sec)

DES

M-DES KBCP-M-DES 1

KBCP-M-DES 2

AES

3-DES

7.4
11.1
14.8
29.7
52
74.2
118.8
742.4
1484.8
2227.2
2969.6

8.5
12.8
17
34
59.6
85.1
136.1
850.7
1701.4
2552.1
3402.8

8.9
13.5
17.8
35.5
62
90
142
890
1780
2670
3550

9.0
13.7
18.1
36.1
63.2
90.3
144.5
903
1806
2708
3612

15
22.5
30
60.1
105.1
150.2
240.3
1501.8
3003.7
4505.5
6007.4

29
43
57
115
201
287
460
2873
5746
8619
11492

6.71

5.85

5.6

5.53

3.31

1.73
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M-DES Simulation
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DES Simulation
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Figure 6.2. The time required to encrypt different file sizes using AES, DES and M-DES on machine 2

It can also be noticed from both figures that KBCP-M-DES in its one and two key
version adds a slight addition to the complexity of DES, but are still less than that of AES
and 3-DES.

6.6

Conclusions

In this chapter we introduced a new methodology to analytically analyzing the complexity for
symmetric block ciphers, which takes into account the time needed to access and retrieve the
memory during the encryption and decryption process. We then applied this methodology
on a class of symmetric block ciphers that includes DES, M-DES, KBCP-M-DES, 3-DES and
AES. We had shown that AES and 3-DES are the most complicated encryption algorithm
within the selected class. Finally, we used computer simulations to compare the accuracy
of the analytical results and their effective encryption rate of different ciphers on different
implemented platforms.
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Chapter 7
Energy Consumption Analysis of
Symmetric Encryption Algorithm
7.1

Introduction

Due to the increased demand on wireless devices and their applications, the necessity for
an efficient, fast and secure encryption algorithms is critical. However, energy resources are
limited in wireless devices, therefore, having a secure an energy efficient encryption algorithm
for wireless applications is a major challenge. A secure encryption algorithm is considered
energy efficient if in addition to being secure, it is easy to implement, use minimum number
of CPU operations and hence uses less energy for encrypting and decrypting the transmitted
and received data. In this chapter we use numerical calculations to analyze the energy
consumption for a class of encryption algorithms including the Advanced encryption standard
(AES), the data encryption standard (DES), the triple DES (3-DES) and a modification to
the data encryption standard called KBCP-M-DES. We compute the number of arithmetic
and logical instructions in addition to computing the number of memory access used by
each of the algorithms under study. Given some information about the microprocessor
used in encryption, we can compute the energy consumed per each instruction (EPI) and
hence compute the total energy consumed by the encryption algorithm. In addition, we use
computer simulations to compare the energy savings of transmitting encrypted information
over the wireless channel using the encryption algorithms under study.
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7.2

Motivation

Given that energy resources are limited in wireless devices and a battery has a limited life
cycle, these resources have to be used as efficient as possible in order to increase the device
life cycle before recharging or changing the battery. The analysis in this chapter, will help us
understand how different parts of the encryption algorithm affects he energy consumption
which will in fact give us better understanding of the tradeoffs between energy consumption
and other factors such as complexity, error performance and security.

7.3

Contributions

Therefore, in this chapter we introduce a comprehensive approach to analyze the energy
consumption for the encryption algorithms under study, where we use two approaches to
compare the energy consumption of encryption algorithms. The first approach is focused
on computing the energy consumption of the microprocessor used for encryption, while
the second approach is more concerned in the energy required to transmit the encrypted
information over the wireless channel.

7.4

Energy Per Instruction (EPI)

With the historical advances in wireless communication and encryption technique, the security of encryption algorithms have improved significantly. However, the energy consumption
of such algorithms should be now taken into account. Smart phones and tablets are the
most used devices in the world today, and the battery life of such devices has played a great
factor affecting customers choices. On the other hand, encryption is vital to be implemented
on those devices due to the fact the wireless medium is open to intruders and their attacks.
Therefore, the energy consumption of encryption algorithms for wireless applications should
be considered and minimized in order to maximize the device battery life.
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In [48] the authors introduced a new mechanism to analytically compute the energy consumption of the microprocessor when performing a certain task, in terms of the number of
instructions required to perform the required task. Hence the energy consumption per each
simple instruction is computed for any microprocessor and hence the total energy consumption of the microsporoses can be found by simply multiplying the energy per instruction
(EPI) by the number of instructions to perform the task. In [49]-[51], the authors make
use of the energy consumption evaluation technique introduced in [48] to measure the energy consumption of the advanced encryption standard and/or other encryption and channel
coding techniques. Although the energy consumption analysis in [49]-[51] was based on computing the total number of instructions required for encryption and decryption, the energy
consumption was not well evaluated due to the fact that the memory access instructions
that are required for encryption and decryption were ignored in the analysis and hence the
energy calculations are not accurate. In addition, all these work was concerned in the energy
consumption of the microprocessor used for encryption and decryption, while the amount of
consumed energy to transmit the encrypted information was not part of these works. However, in [12]-[18] the authors were more focused on the energy consumption of the transmitted
information, where they introduced different encryption and/or channel coding techniques
and computed the energy of the transmitted encrypted/codded signal over a certain range of
signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). The savings in the SNR from one technique to another is used as
a major representation of the transmitted energy savings comparison between two or more
encryption/channel coding techniques.
In this chapter we use a combination of both approaches to compute the energy of the
encryption and decryption process on a certain microprocessor, and to use the bit-error-rate
results computed at the receiver to measure the energy savings from one algorithm to the
other. We compute the energy consumption of the standardized well-known encryption algorithms, the data encryption standard (DES), the triple data encryption algorithm (3-DES)
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and the advanced encryption standard (AES), in addition to other modifications introduced
on the data encryption standard such as the key based coded permutation modified-DES
(KBCP-M-DES) introduced in earlier chapters.
In this section we analyze the energy consumption of the selected encryption algorithms
based on their hardware complexities. In other words, we calculate the total number of
required instructions (i.e, arithmetic, logic and memory access instructions) to encrypt one
or more blocks of data. Based on the hardware used for encryption, we can calculate the
energy consumed by each instruction using that particular hardware. Hence, we can calculate
the total energy consumed by the encryption algorithm on any particular hardware. In later
sections, we analyze the energy savings of each encryption algorithm in regards to the AES
algorithm, based on the SNR savings for a certain bit error rate (BER) requirement. This
is an excellent indicator of the energy saving in a wireless channel environment as shown in
[12]-[18].
The energy per instruction (EPI) concept was first introduced by [48], where a generalized
mechanism for computing the energy consumed by a microprocessor to perform a certain task
was introduced. Each microprocessor requires x amount of joules to perform one instruction
and depending on the total number of instructions required to perform the task, the total
energy consumption for the performed task can be measured. EPI can be used as a measure
for the microprocessor energy efficiency and is measured in Joules/Instruction. The EPI of
a certain microprocessor is a function of the following factors
1. The Microprocessor design in terms of the logic and arithmetic circuits and the layout
2. Process Technology (different fabrication or transistor size, i.e., 0.8 um, 0.6 um, 180
nm, 65 nm)
3. Supply voltage
The energy per instruction depends on the microprocessor clock rate, the number of
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instructions per cycle or per clock (IPC) and the power used by the microprocessor. The
energy per instruction can be simply calculated by the ratio of the power to the performance.
Where the performance is measured in terms of the average number of instructions that can
be processed within one clock cycle. Therefore, the EPI can be given by
EP I =

P
,
F × IP C

(7.4.1)

where P is the power used by the microprocessor and is measured by watts/hour, F is the
clock rate or the frequency of the microprocessor and is measured by HZ and IP C is the
number of instructions that the microprocessor can process during one clock cycle and is
measured by Instructions/Cycle. Given the Power, IPC and the frequency of some popular
microprocessors, we calculate the EPI for these selected microprocessors in Table 7.1.

Table 7.1. Instruction Per Clock Cycle (IPC) and Energy Per Instruction (EPI) for a group of microprocessors

CPU Name Power (Watt)
F
i486
4.9
66 MHZ
Pentium Pro
29.2
150 MHZ
Pentium 4
86
3.6 GHZ
Pentium M
21
2.0 GHZ
Core Due
31
2.167 GHZ

IP C
7.4
8.1
0.5
0.7
1.3

EP I
10
24
48
15
11

For example, if we take the Pentium Core Due microprocessor, where F is equal to 2.167
GHZ, IP C is equal to 1.3 and it requires a power of 31 Watt, the EPI is given by
EP I =

31
= 11 nj,
2.167 × 109 × 1.3

similarly, the average energy per instruction is calculated for other microprocessors given in
Table 7.1.

7.5

Energy Consumption Based on EPI

In this section, we use the Energy Per Instruction (EPI) concept to analytically compute
the energy consumption of various encryption algorithms based on the microprocessor of
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the device running the encryption procedure. As we illustrated earlier through this chapter,
the first step to analytically compute the energy consumption of a microprocessor running
a certain task or procedure, is to find the total number of instructions required to run that
task or procedure.
The complexity analysis for some of the algorithms under study had attracted many
researchers, who developed and used different methodologies to analyze and compute the
number of instructions required to encrypt and decrypt a certain amount of data [52]-[55].
However, those methodologies lacked the comprehensiveness in their analysis, due to the fact
that the memory access time had been ignored, which greatly affects the performance as we
will show in this section.
The complexity analysis in [52]-[55] is based on counting the number of the byte-wise
arithmetic operations required to perform encryption and decryption using each algorithm,
in addition to this, we consider the memory access time required to access and retrieve
necessary information to perform encryption and decryption which was ignored in [52]-[55].
The number of byte-wise arithmetic operations and the number of byte-wise memory access
can be simply transformed to the number of clock cycles required to perform each operation.
The number of clock cycles is general for any platform, because the clock cycle is the smallest
time entity on any platform.
Analyzing the data encryption standard, DES requires 160 byte-wise shift operations,
160 byte-wise XOR operations and 144 byte-wise memory accesses. Given that the Intel x86
instruction set is used, the number of clock cycles required to perform a shift or an XOR
operation is 1 clock cycle only. While the number of clock cycles required to perform one
memory access is averaged at 80 clock cycles [43]. Therefore, the total number of clock cycles
required to encrypt one block of information using DES is equal to 10896 clock cycles. on the
other hand, KBCP-M-DES proposed in earlier chapters requires 880 more clock cycles in its
one key version compared to DES to encrypt one block of information due to the addition of
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the KBCP round, while the two key version requires 2080 additional clock cycles compared to
DES. Similarly, 3-DES requires 160 more XOR operations, 480 more shift operations and 896
more memory access compared to DES, resulting in a total of 32688 clock cycles to encrypt
one block of information using 3-DES. Based on the same analysis done for DES, KBCP-MDES and 3-DES; to encrypt one block of data using AES, 184 byte-wise AND operations,
136 byte-wise OR operations and 352 byte-wise shift operations are required. In addition
to 16 byte-wise XOR operations which are required for the initial stage of AES. Therefore,
Ncc = 17688 clock cycles are required when R = 10 (i.e, 128-bit AES version), Ncc = 21592
clock cycles are required when R = 12 (i.e, 192-bit AES version) and Ncc = 25496 clock
cycles are required when R = 14 (i.e, 256-bit AES version).
Given that the number of clock cycles required for encryption is now known, the encryption energy consumption on a certain microprocessor is given by
Energy = Ncc × IP C × EP I
=

Ncc × P
,
F

(7.5.1)

where Ncc is the number of clock cycles required for encryption. For example, if we use
DES for encryption on an Intel Pentium Core Due microprocessor where the IPC is 1.3,
EPI is equal to 11 nj and Ncc = 10896 as we shown for DES, the energy consumed by
the microprocessor is equal to 10896 × 31/2.167 × 106 = 156 µj. Table 7.2 summarizes the
energy consumption for each of the algorithms under study using each of the IPC and EPI
for different microprocessors presented in Table 7.1. It can be noticed from the table that
3-DES requires the highest energy to get one block of data encrypted. We can also notice
that KBCP-M-DES adds a little more energy to DES due to the fact that KBCP-M-DES
adds a channel coding and permutation round to DES. Furthermore, it can also be noticed
that the IPC and EPI of the microprocessor directly affects the total energy consumption of
the encryption algorithm.
Next, we use numerical results based on the analysis we introduced earlier in this section
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Table 7.2. Energy Consumptions (per byte) of encrypting one data block on a group of Microprocessors in micro
joules using DES, M-DES, AES and 3-DES encryption algorithms

CPU Name DES KBCP-M-DES (one key)
i486
806
871
Pentium Pro 2118
2289
Pentium 4
261
282
Pentium M
114
124
Core Due
156
168

AES-128 3-DES
1309
2419
3439
6355
425
785
186
343
253
467

to find the total energy consumption to encrypt various amount of information using the
different encryption algorithms under study. In figure 7.1 we use the i486 microprocessor
to encrypt different amount of information using DES, KBCP-M-DES, AES and 3-DES.
Similarly, figures 7.2, 7.3, 7.4 and 7.5 represent the energy consumption of using the Pentium
Pro, Pentium 4, Pentium M and the Core Due microprocessors, respectively.

It can be

noticed from the figures that the microprocessor energy consumption (per byte) of 3-DES
is the most and that consumed by DES is the least. While KBCP-M-DES is very close to
both AES and DES.

7.6

Energy Consumption Based on The Error Performance

In the previous section we compared the energy consumption for a class of encryption algorithms based on the energy consumed by the microprocessor used for the encryption process.
Therefore, the previous section analysis depends on the number of instructions and therefore
on the number of clock cycles and the number of instructions per cycles. Moreover, when the
microprocessor that is used for encryption is faster, the number of the required instruction
will decrease and hence the energy consumption of the microprocessor decreases as well. This
analysis is a great representation for the energy consumption of the microprocessor used for
encrypting and decrypting the data, but is not sufficient to represent the energy involved
with the transmission of the encrypted signal over the wireless channel. In this section, we
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Figure 7.1. Energy consumption per byte for encrypting different file sizes using different encryption algorithms
on the Intel i486 Microprocessor

will use a simple but a profound mechanism which is used in the literature to accurately
measure the savings in energy between different channel coding and/or encryption mechanisms used to transmit data over the wireless channel [16]-[18]. In this chapter we use a
comprehensive method of comparison based on both approaches.
In this section, we use computer simulations to encrypt a large amount of information
using the encryption algorithms under study. The encrypted information is then transmitted
over an additive white gaussian noise channel (AWGN) with a binary phase shift keying
(BPSK) modulation scheme. The receiver then decrypts the received information and the
error is computed by comparing the data before encryption at the transmitter with the data
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Figure 7.2. Energy consumption per byte for encrypting different file sizes using different encryption algorithms
on the Intel Pentium Pro Microprocessor

after decryption at the receiver. Figure 7.6 shows the average bit error rate (BER) of the
encryption algorithms under study versus the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of the channel. It
can be inferred from the figure that AES in its 256 bits version has the lowest tolerance to
errors imposed by the wireless channel due to the fact that one bit error at any received
block of encrypted information will result in half the bits of that block to be decrypted in
error due to the strict avalanche effect criterion (SAC). The performance of KBCP-M-DES
in its one key version is similar to that of the two keys version, due to the fact that both
transmits the same information but in different order. Therefore, the transmission energy
for both encryption algorithms will be the same.
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Figure 7.3. Energy consumption per byte for encrypting different file sizes using different encryption algorithms
on the Intel Pentium 4 Microprocessor

Next, we compare the energy consumption of the encryption algorithms under study by
comparing the loss in the SNR at given bit error rate values, where the SNR is the ratio of
the energy of the signal divided by the average energy of the noise and is given by
SN R = 10log10

Eb
,
N0

(7.6.1)

where Eb is the energy per bit of the transmitted signal and N0 is the average power density
of the noise which is assumed to be constant and unity. Therefore, for a certain application
with a certain required BER level, we can get the SNR values for the different encryption
algorithms required to meet that application requirement. And since the noise is assumed to
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Figure 7.4. Energy consumption per byte for encrypting different file sizes using different encryption algorithms
on the Intel Pentium M Microprocessor

be constant and unity we can find the energy of each transmitted encrypted signal. Table 7.3
shows the energy loss imposed by each encryption algorithm in regards to the no encryption
case, for two different applications, which are voice application (i.e, BER = 10−3 ) and video
applications (i.e, BER = 10−6 ).
Table 7.3 summarizes the energy loss of using AES in its 256 bits version, AES in its
192 bits version, AES in its 128 bits version, DES and KBCP-M-DES compared to the
no encryption case, for two required bit error rates applications. It can be noticed from
the table that the transmission energy of the information that is encrypted by KBCP-MDES requires the least amount of energy compared to other encryption algorithm among
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Figure 7.5. Energy consumption per byte for encrypting different file sizes using different encryption algorithms
on the Intel Core Due Microprocessor

the encryption algorithms that are under the study. It can be also noticed that encrypting
voice application data using KBCP-M-DES saves 56% in energy compared to that of using
AES in its 128-bit version, while both algorithms are considered secure against applicable
attacks as shown in previous chapters. We can also notice that KBCP-M-DES saves 42% of
the transmission energy compared to DES whiles DES is considered insecure and subject to
various types of attacks. Therefore using KBCP-M-DES in encryption saves 42% of energy in
voice application and 16% in video application compared to DES, while being secure against
attacks unlike DES. From the table we can also conclude that we can use a secure encryption
algorithms with 29% increase in transmission energy compared to the transmission energy
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when no encryption is present, for the case of voice applications transmission and only 14%
increase in video applications transmission.

Figure 7.7 shows the energy loss percentage of using AES in its 256 bits version, AES in
its 192 bits version, AES in its 128 bits version, DES and KBCP-M-DES compared to the
no encryption case, for different required levels of bit error rate. It can be noticed from the
figure that the energy loss imposed by using the KBCP-M-DES is less compared to other
encryption algorithms under study especially for applications that requires a high value of
bit error rate.
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Table 7.3. Transmission Energy Increase of using AES in its 256 bit version, AES in its 192 bits version, AES
in its 128 bits version, DES and KBCP-M-DES compared to the no encryption case in an AWGN channel with
BPSK modulation

Encryption Technique
KBCP-M-DES
DES
AES-128
AES-192
AES-256

7.7

BER = 10−3
SNR Loss (dB) Energy Loss
1.1
29%
2.23
71%
2.66
85%
2.84
92%
2.95
97%

BER = 10−6
SNR Loss (dB) Energy Loss
0.56
14%
1.15
30%
1.36
36%
1.43
39%
1.5
41%

Conclusions

In this chapter we analyzed the energy consumption for a class of symmetric encryption
algorithms in terms of the number of instructions required for encryption, given the time
and energy required for each instruction. We also took into account the number of memory
access required by each encryption algorithm to encrypt and decrypt information, which
significantly affected the accuracy of our energy consumption analysis. As a result of the
analysis, we found that DES and KBCP-M-DES uses the less energy followed by AES128, AES-192, AES-256 and 3-DES. On the other hand, we used the bit error rate of the
transmitted encrypted signal and the drop in the signal-to-noise ration as measures for the
energy savings for the encryption algorithms under study. We analyzed the energy saving
of AES in its 256, 192 bits version, AES in its 128 bits version, DES and KBCP-M-DES
compared to the no encryption case. As a result, we concluded that the use of KBCP-M-DES
saves almost 68% of the energy compared to AES in its 256 bit version for encrypted voice
transmission application and around 27% for encrypted video transmission applications.
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Chapter 8
Conclusions and Future Work
In this dissertation, we propose new encryption algorithms that are more suitable to the
nature of the wireless channel. We show that the proposed algorithms experience more reliable data transmission and less encountered errors at the receiver compared to standardized
encryption algorithms that are known in the literature. We evaluate the security of the proposed algorithm by measuring the strength of the proposed algorithm to applicable attacks,
and we show that it is impossible to attack our proposed algorithm within a reasonable
amount of time. In addition, we use a new and comprehensive methodologies to evaluate the
performance of the proposed algorithms, where we consider some factors that were ignored
in similar works of the literature, such as the memory access time effect on the encryption
algorithms complexity and time calculations. Moreover, due to the fact that new encryption
algorithm should take into account the energy efficiency in wireless devices and applications
which experience a limited resource of energy, we introduce a comprehensive energy consumption evaluation based on the energy consumption of encrypting the information using
a certain microprocessor in addition to the energy consumption associated with the transmission of the encrypted information. We show that our proposed algorithms outperforms
other secure standardized encryption algorithms in terms of their error performance, security, throughput, complexity and energy consumption. As a future work, we are interested in
further evaluating the performance of the proposed encryption algorithm in MIMO diversity
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channels. we are also interested in further developing new encryption algorithms that are
more efficient in wireless channels (better error performance, less complexity, less energy
consumption and secure against applicable attacks).
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Appendix A
Error Performance of the RSA
Algorithm in Wireless Channels
Asymmetric encryption is different than symmetric encryption in the way it keeps the system
secret and thus the information secret. In symmetric key cryptography the secrecy of the
key was shared between two or more users. However, in asymmetric key cryptography each
user maintains his own key secret. The main difference between the two approach is that in
symmetric key cryptography, the same key is used for encryption and decryption and this
key is shared between the two or more entities of the communication. On the other hand, in
asymmetric key cryptography the encryption and decryption are performed using different
keys [45].
In this approach, each user generates two different keys. The first key is called the public
key while the other is called the private key. Each user should then broadcast to the other
users his public key, while keeping the private key secret and hidden from every other user.
If user A want to send an encrypted message to user B, user A should encrypt the message
with user’s B public key. Since user B has the private key he should be able to decrypt
the encrypted message. If he could not decrypt it, that means that the message was not
encrypted with his public key and hence the message is not intended for him. One of the
other differences between the two encryption approaches is that in asymmetric encryption
the plaintext and ciphertext are treated as integer numbers, therefore the encryption and
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decryption process are sets of mathematical functions on these integers. However, symmetric
encryption as we already discussed is based on bit manipulation operation on the data in its
binary format. The functions used in asymmetric encryption should be trapdoor one way
function. A trapdoor one way function is a function that satisfies the following
1. Given x, y = f (x) is easy to compute.
2. The inverse of the function is difficult to compute. Given y = f (x), it is difficult to
find x = f −1 (x).
3. Given y and a trapdoor, x can be easily computed.
Some examples of algorithms that are based on asymmetric key cryptography are
1. RSA cryptosystem
2. ElGamal cryptosystem
3. DSS (Digital Signature Standard)
4. Diffie-Hellman key exchange protcol
5. various elliptic curves cryptosystem
6. Paillier cryptosystem
The asymmetric encryption approach has been used by many protocols such as
1. GPG software (GNU Privacy Guard)
2. Internet key exchange protocol
3. PGP computer program (Pretty Good Privacy)
4. SSH network protocol (Secure Shell)
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A.1

Algorithm Design and Structure

RSA is one of the most common asymmetric (public) key cryptosystem, it is named for its
inventors Rivest, Shamir and Adleman [46]. It was the first algorithm to be used in signing
and encryption, it is considered secure given that the keys used are long enough. As any
other public key algorithm, RSA has two major phases which are the key generation phase
and the encryption/decryption phase.

A.1.1

Key Generation

RSA uses two keys, public and private keys. The public key is known to everyone, and
is used for encryption. Messages encrypted with the public key can only be decrypted by
the corresponding private key, which is known to its own creator only. The two keys are
generated by the following procedure:
1. Two distinct prime numbers p and q are chosen.
2. Compute n = pq
3. Compute φ(n) = (p − 1)(q − 1)
4. An integer e is chosen, such that 1 < e < φ(n) and gcd(e, φ(n)) = 1
5. Compute d = e−1 (modφ(n)) (often computed using the Extended Euclidian algorithm)
6. The tuple (e, n) is the public key which will be announced, while d is the private key

A.1.2

Encryption and Decryption

Assuming that Alice wants to transmit a message M to Bob, the encryption procedure is
desribed by the following procedure:
1. Given that Bob already broadcasted his public key (e, n), Alice has Bob’s public key.
2. Alice turns M into an integer m where 0 < m < n using an agreed upon protocol.
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3. Alice then computes and transmits the cipher c = me (modn), this operation can be
easily done using the fast exponentiation algorithm.
When Bob receives the cipher c, the decryption process is simply done using the private key
d to recover the original message m = cd (modn).

A.1.3

Simple Example

1. Choose two distinct primes p = 61 and q = 53.
2. Compute n = pq = 61 × 53 = 3233.
3. Compute φ(3233) = (61 − 1) × (53 − 1) = 3120.
4. Choose e, such that 1 < e < 3120 and gcd(e, φ(3233) = 1, let e = 17.
5. Compute d = e−1 (modφ(n)) = 2753, the multiplicative inverse of e.
6. The public key is (e = 17, n = 3233), the private key is d = 2753.
7. Lets assume that the message that needs to be encrypted is m = 65, the ciphertext c
equals 6517 (mod3233) = 2790.
8. To decrypt the cipher, m can be calculated by m = 27902753 (mod3233) = 65.

A.1.4

Security

Factorization Attack
The security of RSA is based on choosing large modulus n and keeping p and q secret, if
an attacker can factorize the modulus n and find p and q then he will be able to compute
d. To have RSA secure, the modulus n should be more than 300 decimal digits, that means
that n should be at least 1024 bits long. Factorizing such a number would be impossible in
a feasible time. There are many other attacks on RSA such as follows:
• Chosen ciphertext attack.
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• Encryption exponent attack.
• Related message attack.
• Short pad attack.
• Revealed decryption exponent attack
• Broadcast attack.
• Low decryption exponent attack.
• Short message attack.
• Cycling attack.
• Unconcealed message attack.
• Common modulus attack.
• Timing attack.
• Power attack.
Some recommendation need to be considered in order to have RSA secure.
1. n should be at least 1024 bits.
2. p and q must each be at least 512 bits.
3. The values of p and q should not be very close to each other.
4. Both p − 1 and q − 1 should have at least one large prime factor.
5. The modulus n should not be shared.
6. The value of e should be 216 + 1 or integer close to this value.
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7. If the private key d is leaked, the sender must immediately change n as well as both e
and d.

A.1.5

Complexity

The complexity of RSA is imposed by the following factors.
• Since n should be at least 1024 bits, and both p and q should be at least 512 bits, the
memory needed in the key generation, encryption and decryption should be adequate
to these minute requirements.
• Each user has to keep a large portion of information secret (n, d), otherwise the algorithm can be easily cracked.
• Depending on the application, it is not always easy to represent the data in an integer
format.

A.2

Error Performance in the Wireless Channel

In this section we are studying and evaluating the error characteristics of the RSA encryption
algorithms. We are assuming that one or more of the transmitted (encrypted) bits are
received in error. Therefore, different cipher will be decrypted at the receiver, which leads to
a different plaintext after decryption. We already shown in previous chapters that the average
probability of error when the data encryption standard is used is 0.5. Figure A.2 shows that
using RSA for encryption and decryption will result in a random average probability of error
at the receiver, even if the number of runs is increased. It is shown form the figure if we
have 500,000 runs this will result in an average probability of error of 0.6. Similarly, it can
be clarly noticed from the figure that if the number of runs increases to a million run, the
average probability of error dose not converge to 0.5 as the case of DES.
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Figure A.1. Average Probability of error over RSA

Figure A.2 shows another experiment for three bits in error at the receiver. The observations are the same as those of the previous figure.
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Figure A.2. Average Probability of error over RSA

A.3

Comments

It can be clearly noticed that asymmetric key cryptiosystem and RSA as an example do not
satisfy the avalanche effect criteria, and the average error probability is different from run
to run, and it dose not converge when the number of runs increase. Therefore, asymmetric
key algorithms are out of the scope of this work.
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